Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea
Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea is a solitaire game about
the Battle of the Philippine Sea, fought June 19-20,
1944, near the Mariana Islands. This was the greatest
aircraft carrier battle in history and also the last time
the Japanese navy sortied seeking a decisive action
with the serious hope that it might win. The Americans
accomplished their mission of protecting the invasion
fl eet and shot down a great many Japanese aircraft,
but many US naval offi cers were disappointed with the
result. Can you do better?
The game focuses on the central problems of
carrier warfare: searching for the enemy, evaluating
intelligence, launching air strikes, and protecting one’s
own fl eet from enemy raids. The game rules dictate
how Japanese forces arrive in play, move, and attack.

1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Game Overview and Basic Concepts
1.2 How to Learn the Game
2.0 GAME EQUIPMENT
2.1 Game Map
2.2 US and Japanese Displays
2.3 Unit Counters
2.4 Player Aids
2.5 Dice
3.0 SEQUENCE OF PLAY
3.1 Sequence Outline
3.2 Activation Chits
4.0 US AIR MISSIONS
4.1 Air Mission Displays
4.2 Air Strike Missions
4.3 Intercept Missions
4.4 US Air Mission Movement
4.5 Air-to-air Combat
5.0 AIR/SEA COMBAT
5.1 US Air Strike Attack Procedure
5.2 Contact
5.3 Surprise
5.4 Japanese CAP
5.5 Anti-aircraft Fire
5.6 Air-to-Ship Attacks
5.7 Japanese Air Raid Attack Procedure
6.0 TASK GROUPS AND CARRIER OPERATIONS
6.1 Task Group Display
6.2 Air Operations
6.3 US Movement
6.4 Dusk/Night Recovery and Illumination
7.0 JAPANESE FORCES
7.1 Japanese Force Arrival
7.2 Japanese Force Movement
7.3 Intelligence Levels
7.4 Level 4 Carrier Forces
7.5 Double Forces (Optional)
8.0 DETECTION AND SEARCH
8.1 Detection
8.2 Air Search Missions
8.3 Air Search Resolution
9.0 JAPANESE CARRIER FORCES
9.1 Butai Display
9.2 Air Points, Known Air Strength, and Air Value
10.0 JAPANESE AIR RAIDS
10.1 Air Raid Procedure
10.2 Raid Placement and Movement
10.3 Air Raid Return
11.0 JAPANESE LAND-BASED AIR
11.1 Land Air Bases and Units
11.2 Land-Based Air Raids
12.0 DAMAGE, FIRE, AND CRIPPLED SHIPS
12.1 US Carrier Damage
12.2 Japanese Carrier Damage
12.3 Fire
12.4 Crippled Ships
12.5 Surface Ship Damage
13.0 COMMITMENT
13.1 Commitment Index
13.2 Commitment Limits
14.0 SUBMARINES
14.1 U. S. Submarines
14.2 Japanese Submarines
15.0 VICTORY CONDITIONS
15.1 Victory PointsADVANCED RULES
16.0 LAND AIR REINFORCEMENTS
16.1 Land Air Reinforcements Procedure
16.2 Land Air Reinforcement Arrival
17.0 LEEWARD MOVEMENT
18.0 ADVANCED SEARCH OPTIONS
18.1 Shadowing
18.2 Extended Search Range
18.3 Location Uncertainty
19.0 RETIREMENT
20.0 JAPANESE REFUELLING
21.0 SURFACE COMBAT
22.0 NIGHT AIR OPERATIONS
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA1
TABLE OF CONTENTS

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23.0 SHUTTLE RAIDS TO GUAM
24.0 ADDITIONAL VARIANTS
24.1 TG 58.1 Not Present
24.2 Less Effective Interception
24.3 No US Submarines
24.4 New Japanese Aircraft Types
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This section gives a broad and general overview of the
game. For precise rules on all topics mentioned see
the later rules sections.
1.1 GAME OVERVIEW AND BASIC CONCEPTS
In Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea, you control a US fl eet
consisting of carriers, their air units, and surface units.
These are organized into task groups. Aircraft are
controlled mainly on the off-map displays on the right-
hand side of the mapsheet. Aircraft are either on board
a carrier or organized as part of an air mission (strike or
intercept). Aircraft on board a carrier are moved about
the task group displays to indicate their current state
of readiness: stored in the hangar, arming and fuelling,
ready on the fl ight deck, etc.
The Japanese appear in the game as forces. A force
counter can represent many ships or none at all. Forces
arrive randomly and move initially according to a
concept of mission movement, attempting to reach the
invasion areas off Saipan. After contacting US forces,
they maneuver for best tactical advantage.
In each turn, you will ready planes, launch them on
search missions, and then launch air strikes against
detected forces. At the same time, Japanese forces
within range may launch air raids against you. The
fi rst you will learn of an incoming attack is when it
is detected on radar. You will not know the exact
composition of a force which attacked you; you will
just know how many planes appeared.
Japanese forces progress through fi ve different
intelligence levels, representing increasingly precise
and reliable information. All forces start at Level 0,
meaning that you know nothing (not even whether the
force is real, or a false contact). With repeated search
contacts a force progresses ultimately to Level 4, at
which point you know the exact force composition.
Some Japanese forces will be discovered to contain
carriers -- either because you search them, or because
they attack you. Japanese carrier forces generate
air attacks according to a set of rules that model the
likelihood that a force found you, the likelihood that
it had carriers, and its admiral’s decision about how
much strength to put into an attack.
Each game turn consists of four identical action phases.
In each phase, some portion of the Japanese forces
(chosen by chit draw) can move and attack. In every
action phrase, air units of both sides fl y missions and
are moved around on the carriers.
1.2 HOW TO LEARN THE GAME
The rules to Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea are lengthy,
but they have been structured to assist you in learning
them. We strongly recommend you begin by reading
rules section 2 (Game Equipment) and section 3
(Sequence of Play) and then read the Comprehensive
Example of Play, which appears in the Play Book. This
will give you a good idea of how the game works,
providing context for understanding the actual rules.
Like its predecessor game Carrier (Victory Games,
1990), Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea includes many
mechanics and concepts not found in other wargames.
So that you may learn these in small chunks, the rules
use the method of programmed instruction, making
use of small scenarios to teach the game.
Scenarios 1 through 5 each introduce a new portion of
the full rules set as well as a specifi c part of the actual
battle. Thus, in addition to teaching the rules, these
scenarios serve as an introduction to the history. It is
strongly recommended to learn the game by playing
these scenarios, each of which can be set up and
played fairly quickly. Each of these scenarios appears in
the Play Book, and the rules indicate the specifi c point
at which you should stop reading and play each one.
Scenarios 6 through 9, also in the Play Book, are the
full game. The Comprehensive Example illustrates the
opening moves of Scenario 6. Scenarios 7 through 9
present different possible battle situations, but are no
more diffi cult then Scenario 6. The main rules indicate
the point at which you are ready to play these full
scenarios.
For later variation or increased challenge and realism,
most scenarios include some variations to setup,
scenario rules, etc. When you are ready, you can also
use any of the Advanced Rules you wish (sections
16.0 and after). These are not necessary to enjoy the
game (although some are recommended), but they
will extend your enjoyment once you have learned the
standard rules.
While programmed instruction is great for learning, it
does mean that the rules must be organized in order of
teaching and not in order of the sequence of play.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 2

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The ‘order of teaching’ is dictated in part by the need to
make bite-size scenarios for learning; this, for example,
is why the rules on air-to-air combat [Scenario 1] come
before rules on actually launching aircraft. To enable
easier reference during play we have provided a Game
Turn Flow Chart, which shows the entire sequence of
play with rules references. It is recommended to keep
this play-aid in front of you for reference.
As you read you will notice some asymmetries in the
terms used in the rules: for example, we speak of US
“air strikes” but Japanese “air raids,” and of US “task
groups” but Japanese “forces.” This is intentional: it
refl ects that your knowledge of what is going on with
US units is much different from your knowledge of the
Japanese, so these entities function differently in the
game.

2.0 GAME EQUIPMENT
A complete game of Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea includes the following components:
One mapsheet with hexgrid game map and displays
Three die-cut counter sheets
One Game Turn Flow Chart player aid card
One Air Raid Flow Chart / Japanese Movement
Priorities player aid card
One Butai Displays player aid card
Four Charts and Tables cards, printed both sides
Rule book
One 10-sided die
2.1 GAME MAP
The hex grid game map portrays the area of the Pacifi c
Ocean where the Battle of the Philippine Sea took
place, at a scale of 33 nautical miles per hex.
2.11 The Japanese arrival hexes, movement
compasses, and movement zones printed on the
map control the arrival and subsequent movement of
Japanese forces.
2.12 The map depicts certain large islands including
Saipan and Guam. (Note, these islands are not drawn
to scale on the map, but are shown at larger size.) A
US carrier task group may not enter an island hex.
Japanese forces may enter any hex.
2.13 The map is divided into an eastern section and a
western section. The red line that zig-zags down the
middle of the map divides eastern map zones from
western ones. The two sections have some different
rules for Japanese movement.
2.2 US AND JAPANESE DISPLAYS
The game includes several displays for control of
carrier forces and their aircraft. Air units mostly
operate on these displays, not on the map itself. These
include the Task Group displays (US carrier forces),
Butai displays (Japanese carriers), Air Mission displays
(US), and Guam Air Display (Japanese). (For the
meaning of the Japanese word “Butai,” see the design
note in section 9.1.)
2.21 The Task Group displays (6.1) are used to hold
US ships organized into task groups. US surface
ship counters are rarely placed directly on the map;
normally they occupy these displays.
2.211 There are fi ve historical US task groups,
numbered 58.1, 58.2, 58.3, 58.4 and 58.7. Task Group
58.7 is also called “Battle Line”: it has no carriers, but
seven battleships. Since it has no carriers, it does not
have its own task group display, just a holding box.
Battle Line has some special abilities for antiaircraft
defense against Japanese raids. Extra surface task
groups are also possible as a scenario variation.
2.22 The air mission displays (4.1) show the units in
each US air strike or intercept mission, and the amount
of fuel remaining for that mission.
2.23 The Butai displays (9.1), on separate cards, are
used to hold the ships of Japanese carrier forces, as
well as information about the air assets of those forces.
2.24 The Guam Air Display (11.2) holds raids launched
from the Japanese land base of Guam.
2.25 The “Task Force 58 -- in hex” box is provided as a
convenience to hold units that are in the same hex as
Task Force 58, since at times a signifi cant number of
pieces can be piled into this one hex.
2.26 For convenience, map boxes are provided to hold
sunken Japanese ships, Japanese ships exited from
the map, and also lost/destroyed US air units. Separate
boxes are provided for air units lost in the same hex
as a US task group versus units lost elsewhere, as the
latter are weighted more heavily in assessing victory
(15.1).
2.3 UNIT COUNTERS
2.31 The playing pieces represent the ships and aircraft
of each side. Many pieces are markers to record
information known to you at a given moment.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA3

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2.32 US ship units may represent:
Individual aircraft carriers (CV or CVL), battleships (BB),
or anti-aircraft cruisers (CLAA)
Heavy or light cruiser divisions (CruDiv, 2-3 ships each)
Destroyer squadrons/divisions (Desron or DesDiv, 3-5 ships each).
2.33 Japanese ship units represent individual aircraft
carriers (CV, CVL), individual battleships (BB), and
groupings of cruisers and destroyers.
A “cruiser force” represents two or more heavy cruisers plus a screen of destroyers. A “destroyer force” represents anywhere from three to ten destroyers, possibly with a light cruiser attached.
2.34 US air units represent 12 aircraft each. Japanese
air points represent about eight aircraft each. (The
different scales were chosen to give the most natural
representation of the air groups on each side’s
ships.) Note that because of this and certain other
asymmetries, US and Japanese air-to-air combat use
separate tables.
DESIGN NOTE: Players of the Carrier game will note
that the scale for US air units is quite different here.
That is because of the scale of this battle. More US
aircraft and fl ight decks took part in this battle than in
all the South Pacifi c battles put together.
2.341 Certain US air units are night capable (see Unit
Counter Summary). These are treated the same as
other units unless using optional rule 22.0.
2.35 Japanese ships are classifi ed as either “historical,”
“additional,” or “ghost.”
• Ships with no backprinting are “historical ships.”
These ships took part in the actual battle.
• Ships backprinted “Addl” are “additional ships.”
These are ships that did not take part in the actual
battle, but might have. The US player can choose
when setting up the game whether to use these
ships.
• Ships backprinted “Scen 9” are “ghost ships.”
These are intended for use only in Scenario 9, the
Great Carrier Battle of the Pacifi c. Historically,
these ships had already been sunk in earlier
campaigns, and did not appear at the Battle of the
Philippine Sea.
2.36 The following abbreviations are used on the
playing pieces and in the rules:
(Note: The game does not distinguish specifi c types for
Japanese aircraft.)
Ship and Ship Unit Types
CV - Fleet carrier
CVL - Light carrier (see Design Note following)
BB -- Battleship
CLAA -- Light Cruiser, Anti-aircraft
CruDiv -- Cruiser Division
DesDiv -- Destroyer Division
Desron -- Destroyer Squadron
Other
AA -- Anti-aircraft
CAP -- Combat Air Patrol
DRM -- Die-roll modifi er
DESIGN NOTE: The term “CVL” in US Navy parlance
referred to specifi c classes of carriers built on light
cruiser hulls. The American fl eet in this game includes
a number of these. For convenience we also use the
term to refer to all Japanese carriers below fl eet carrier
size.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 4

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2.4 PLAYER AIDS
The player aids include four charts and tables cards
(printed front and back) with the charts and tables
required to play the game, and three other player
aid cards each printed on one side only: the Game
Turn Flow Chart, the Butai Displays, and the Air Raid
Flow Chart (on the reverse of which is the Japanese
Movement Priorities chart). The Game Turn Flow Chart
and Butai Displays will be needed throughout the
game and will hold pieces; they should be laid out in
a convenient place beside the map. The Air Raid Flow
Chart and the Movement Priorities, like the charts and
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA5

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tables, are to be referred to only when needed. The
intent is that once a player is familiar with the rules, the
game can be played mainly from these player aids with
only infrequent reference to the rule book.
At the place where a chart or table is fi rst referenced,
the rules will include an indication of where to fi nd it:
for example “Card 1, front” meaning the front side of
Card 1.
2.41 Many tables list die roll modifi ers (DRM). In all
cases, if the modifi ed roll exceeds the greatest value
shown, or is less than the smallest value shown, use
that greatest or smallest value. For example if your
modifi ed die roll is -1, but the smallest die roll line
shown is 1, use 1.
2.5 DICE
All die rolls in the game use a 10-sided die. A “0” is
read in all cases as “10.”
0 SEQUENCE OF PLAY
If any parts are damaged or missing please contact:
Compass Games, LLC
PO Box 278
Cromwell, CT 06416
Phone: (860) 301-0477
E-mail: support@compassgames.com
Online game support is available. Visit us on the
web: https://www.compassgames.com
You can also use the URL or QR code to reach
Compass Games online:
https://linktr.ee/compassgames
3.0 SEQUENCE OF PLAY
Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea is played in game turns.
Each turn consists of several phases, some of which
are further divided into segments. Each complete turn
represents 80 minutes of real time.
This full sequence of play is placed here for reference
and as a further introduction to the full game. Scenarios
1-4 use only selected portions of the sequence, as
described in scenario special rules. Scenarios 5 and
after use the full sequence.
The Game Turn Flow Chart player-aid card is an
important reference during play. Use the Action Phase
and Segment markers with this fl ow chart to record the
current action phase and segment.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 6

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3.1 SEQUENCE OUTLINE
I. Arrival Phase
1. Determine how many Japanese forces arrive this
turn (7.1).
2. Place new Japanese forces on the map (7.1).
3. Place Activation Chits for the new forces into the
cup and count the total number of activation chits
in the cup. Place the Chits Per Phase marker (3.24).
II. First Action Phase
Japanese Air Movement Segment
Move all Japanese air raids on the map (10.23 or
scenario-specifi c rules).
Activation Segment
1. Draw activation chits. The same number of chits is
drawn in each phase (3.2).
2. For each Japanese force activated:
• Apply the carrier air raid procedure (10.1).
• If the force is a carrier force, move air units on
the Air Raid Return or Turnaround sections of
its Butai display one box to the right (9.12).
• Move the activated force (7.2).
3. If Guam is activated, carry out the land-based air
raid procedure (11.2).
4. If using rule 16.0, Land Air Reinforcements, and if
the chit for Iwo Jima or Yap/Peleliu is drawn, carry
out the Land Air Reinforcement procedure.
5. If the US Subs chit is drawn, resolve US submarine
actions (14.1).
6. If the US Move chit is drawn, US task groups / task
forces can move (6.3).
US Air Movement Segment
Move US air missions and expend fuel (4.4).
US Air Search Segment (once per game-turn)
Once per game turn the US player can declare an Air
Search segment in which he moves search aircraft
(8.2) and conducts air searches (8.3).
US Air Operations Segment
For each carrier task group, perform US air
operations -- launch, raising, servicing, lowering,
landing (6.2).
US Interception Segment
Perform air-to-air combat (4.5) between US
intercept missions and Japanese raids.
Japanese Air Attack Segment
Perform Japanese air/sea attacks against US task
groups (5.7).
US Air Attack Segment
Perform US air/sea attacks against Japanese forces
(5.1), including air-to-air combat against Japanese
CAP.
End of Action Phase
1. Check for removal of Inoperative Flight Deck
(12.13) and Deck Crash (4.452, if used) markers.
2. Move Action Phase marker to next box
II. Second Action Phase
Identical to fi rst.
IV. Third Action Phase
Identical to fi rst.
V. Fourth Action Phase
Identical to fi rst.
VI. Game Turn End Phase
1. Hit Adjustment step: Japanese “Hit Previous Turn”
markers become permanent hits, and “Hit Current
Turn” markers become “Hit Previous Turn.”
2. Fire Step: Assess fi re damage for any US carriers
currently on fi re (12.3).
3. Japanese Submarine Attack step (6.433):
Check for possible submarine attack versus any
illuminated hex. Illumination markers may be
removed.
4. Advance Game Turn marker and return Action
Phase and Segment markers to initial boxes.
3.2 ACTIVATION CHITS
3.21 Activation chits are used to determine when
Japanese forces are activated and when certain other
actions take place. Activation chits are placed in a
cup (a coffee mug works well) and drawn during each
Action Phase. Chits are resolved in the order drawn.
3.22 The following activation chits are available:
Japanese Force Activation -- One per force in the
game.
US Subs -- Scenario 6 and after, only.
Guam -- Scenario 6 and after, only.
Iwo Jima, Yap/Peleliu -- Only if using Japanese Land
Air Reinforcements (16.0).
US Move - Allows TF 58 and US task groups to
move.
No Op (these look the same as other activation chits,
but say “No Op”). A No Op chit causes no action
when drawn; it does not activate anything.
3.23 During the arrival phase, you restock the cup with
action chits as follows:
1. One chit for each force now on the map (including
forces arriving that turn, 7.1).
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA7

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2. Include the US Move chit, US Subs chit, and the
Guam chit as required by scenario.
3. Include the Iwo Jima and Yap/Peleliu chits if using
optional rule 16.0.
4. Finally, add No Op chits as required so that the
total number of chits in the cup is evenly divisible
by four.
3.24 One-quarter of the total number of chits are drawn
in each action phase. You may place the “Chits Per
Phase” marker on the General Records Track to record
this.
EXAMPLE: It is Scenario 6, and there are 14
Japanese forces on the map. You add the US
Move, US Subs and the Guam chit. Assume rule
16.0 is not in play, so you will not use the Iwo Jima
or Yap/Peleliu chits. The total is 17 chits.17 is not
divisible by four; the next number evenly divisible
by four is 20, so you add all three No Op chits to the
cup as well. You will draw fi ve chits in each of the
four Action Phases. You place the Chits Per Phase
marker in the ‘5’ box of the General Records Track.
4.0 US AIR MISSIONS
US air units are moved about the map primarily as part of air missions. There are two types of air mission: intercept and air strike.
4.1 AIR MISSION DISPLAYS
4.11 The US player has sixteen individually identifi ed
air mission counters: “Air Strike 1” through “Air Strike
8,” and “Intercept 1” through “Intercept 8.” These
represent aircraft fl ying missions. The air mission
counter is placed on the map while the individual air
units are placed on the air mission displays.
4.12 There is one air mission display for each
numbered mission. It contains a box to hold the units
on the mission, and a track to record the mission’s
remaining fuel.
4.13 The air mission displays are labelled generically
“Air Mission.” Each can be used for either type of air
mission. Use the air mission counter for the desired
type. For example, to use track 6 for an air raid, use the
“Air Strike 6” counter, and to use it for an intercept use
“Intercept 6.”
• As a practical matter, when glancing at the
display you can recognize strike missions
because they will be the ones that have attack
aircraft types.
• Thus, the US can have a maximum total of eight
missions, both types included, at one time; this
is a design limit refl ecting command and control
limitations.
4.14 An air mission is formed by launching aircraft in
the Air Operations Segment. The player selects an
unused mission display, places the units in the box,
places the Fuel marker on the fuel track, and places
the mission counter itself onto the map. The mission
counter is placed in the hex containing the task group
that launched the units.
• An air mission can move, within certain special
limits, in the same phase it is placed on the map.
See 4.42.
• Units launched from different task groups in
the same hex can be combined into a single air
mission. (Exception: CAP, 4.33) Units launching in
different hexes cannot.
• Units just launched can be added to a previously
existing air mission (of either type) in the same
hex, if the player wishes. The mission’s Fuel
marker is set to be the minimum of its current
value, and the Fuel value the launched units would
have if placed in a separate mission.
• The type of an air mission cannot be changed in
fl ight, e.g. you cannot convert an intercept mission
to a strike mission.
• Once air units are placed in a mission they remain
in that mission until they are eliminated or land;
units cannot be transferred between air missions.
(Exception: 4.37)
4.15 The Fuel marker for a new mission is placed
initially in the box corresponding to the lowest
endurance value of any aircraft in the mission.
For example, if a strike mission included both F6F
(endurance 16) and SB2C (endurance 14) units, place
the marker in the “4” box with the “+10” side up,
representing the value 14. The marker is moved down
the track as the mission fl ies (4.4).
• There is a special type of intercept mission
(Combat Air Patrol) which does not get a Fuel
marker right away. See 4.33
DESIGN NOTE: Fuel was a critical consideration in all
the US air operations in this battle. The Japanese were
able to search and attack beyond the ranges at which
the US could operate comfortably. The US launched
its one large strike -- on the afternoon of June 20 --
knowing that it would be a struggle for many of the
planes to return. Fuel was also a consideration for the
defending US fi ghters, as planes low on fuel had to be
landed and replaced.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 8

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4.16 Units in an air mission may be landed on any
carrier in a task group in the same hex, during the US
Air Operations Segment. They must be brought down
to the hangar and go through servicing (6.2) before
being launched again. (Note: In Scenarios 1 and 2 there
is no servicing; air units fl y at most one mission each.)
• Note that it is permissible for an air mission to wait
in the task group’s hex (burning one Fuel Point per
Air Movement Segment, per rule 4.431) until there
is room to land. This can easily happen with rule
17.0 (Leeward Movement).
4.2 AIR STRIKE MISSIONS
Note: Section 4.2 is included here for easier reference
but is not actually needed until Scenario 2. You may
skip it on a fi rst reading and return to it when playing
Scenario 2.
The purpose of an air strike is to attack detected
Japanese forces or the land base at Guam.
4.21 An air strike mission may contain any type of
aircraft. Attack planes (SBD, SB2C, TBF, TBM) will
attack enemy ships. Fighter aircraft (F6F) will not attack
enemy ships, but will act as escorts.
4.22 A strike cannot move more than two hexes away
from its launching carriers unless moving directly
towards a detected enemy force or Guam. Any level of
detection (8.1) suffi ces.
4.23 It is permitted to start moving a raid towards one
target and then redirect it to a different one if a better
target becomes detected. It is also permitted to fl y
around within two hexes of the task group and wait for
a target to be detected. Rule 4.22 only prohibits fl ying a
raid speculatively toward a force not yet detected.
DESIGN NOTE: This rule exists to prevent you
from taking advantage in an unrealistic way of extra
knowledge you have in the game. Historically, the
US had strike planes ready on the morning of the
19th, but these planes were fl own off the decks
when incoming Japanese raids were detected, and
circled a little to the east during the air battles.
4.24 An air strike may not engage in air-to-air combat
with a Japanese air raid.
4.25 4.25 An air strike can never be split while in fl ight.
(An intercept mission can be; see 4.37.)
4.3 INTERCEPT MISSION
The purpose of an intercept mission is to shoot down
incoming Japanese air raids.
DESIGN NOTE: The interception mechanic is one of
the biggest ways in which Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea
differs from its predecessor, Carrier. By June 1944 the
US Navy had perfected a technique of radar-controlled
interception which allowed incoming raids to be
intercepted at distances of 75 to almost 150 miles from
the fl eet. (This required both good radar technology
and also the effective radio discipline to make use of
it.) Intercept missions in the game work essentially like
little air strikes which fl y out to do battle with incoming
raids.

Intercept missions can also represent Combat Air Patrol (CAP), which was a force of fi ghter planes
maintained in the air for close protection of the fl eet. A
few of these at a time would touch down for refuelling
so that the patrol was maintained. In the game, CAP is
portrayed as a special type of intercept mission which
is restricted to the task group’s hex. Essentially its
purpose is to have some planes ready in the air when
a raid is detected; the cost is that these planes will
have a lower initial fuel level (4.35).
4.31 An intercept mission may contain only fi ghter (F6F
or F6F-3) units. Units launched from different carriers
and task groups may be combined in a single mission.
4.32 A normal intercept mission is placed on the map
and given a fuel marker, like a strike mission. The Fuel
marker is initially placed at 16 (the endurance value of
the F6F). The mission may then be moved, with limits,
in the same phase it is placed (4.42). (These missions
typically are formed when an incoming raid is detected,
and fl y out to intercept the raid.)
4.33 Intercept missions can also be placed on Combat
Air Patrol (CAP), as follows:
• All units in each CAP mission must be launched
from the same task group.
• A task group can have at most two CAP missions
totaling at most three air units between them.
CAP missions are placed in the group’s CAP box.
• A CAP mission is not given a fuel marker.
• The mission remains in the CAP box unless placed
on the map (4.34, 4.35), at which point it acquires
a fuel marker.
• CAP missions can be created only at launch; a
mission on the map cannot be moved to the CAP
box.
(Note: the limits on CAP missions refl ect the need to
cycle planes to refuel.)
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA9

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4.34 A CAP mission is placed on the map (and receives
a Fuel marker, 4.35) in two cases:
1. During the US Air Movement Segment, a CAP
mission may be placed on the map in its task
group’s hex. The mission may then move
normally in that same segment. The reason for
placing the mission on the map in this way is to
allow it to fl y out and intercept incoming raids.
2. A CAP mission must be placed on the map in
order to fi ght air-to-air combat in its hex. This
can be done during the US Interception Segment.
A mission cannot fi ght air-to-air combat while it
remains in the CAP box.
In either case, from that point on the mission functions
as a normal intercept mission. It cannot return to the
CAP box.
4.35 A CAP mission receives a fuel marker when
placed on the map. The player rolls a die and consults
the Interception Fuel Level Table (card 1, front) to
determine the initial fuel state. Place the Fuel marker on
the track accordingly. From this point on the marker is
used to track fuel state as for any other air mission.
EXAMPLE: The player rolls the die and obtains a
‘7’. The result is the CAP mission starts with a Fuel
Level of 13.
4.36 An intercept mission can be moved anywhere
the US player wishes, except into a hex containing a
Japanese naval (force or ship) unit. In other words, it
cannot be used like an air strike, but apart from that it
can go anywhere, including Guam. (Indeed, sending
an intercept mission over Guam early in the game is a
useful tactic, and was done historically.)
4.37 An intercept mission can be split at any time while
in fl ight, provided a free air mission display is available.
Move the desired number of units onto the second
display and place its counter on the map in the same
hex as the original mission. The second mission gets
the same Fuel value as the original. Two missions can
never be combined.
4.4 US AIR MISSION MOVEMENT
Except as noted, all rules in this section apply equally
to both types of US air missions.
4.41 US air missions move in every US Air Movement
Segment. A mission moves from hex to hex.
Terrain (islands) and Japanese units do not affect air mission movement.
4.42 A mission which has just been launched can move
one (and only one) hex, at the cost of one fuel point,
at the same time it is launched. This is a special move
occuring outside the US Air Movement Segment.
4.43 Air missions expend fuel for movement, combat,
and landing as follows (4.431-4.435). Adjust the fuel
marker on the mission’s track to show the expenditure
of fuel.
4.431 The fi rst hex of movement in a US Air Movement
Segment costs one fuel point.
•The player may choose not to move the mission at
all -- keeping it in the same hex -- but he still pays
the cost of one fuel point.
4.432 An air mission may move one additional hex
per segment, at a cost of one or two additional fuel
points. The US player must roll the die. On a roll of 1-5
he must expend one additional point (a total of two for
the entire move). On a roll of 6-10 he must expend two
additional points (a total of three for the entire move).
4.433 An air mission must pay one additional fuel
point to land, over and above the cost to move into the
landing hex. If unable to pay this fuel point it suffers a
DRM of +2 on its Safe Return die roll (4.451).
• It is permitted to land some of the air units in a
mission and leave others aloft. In the case where
the mission is remaining stationary in the landing
hex, it pays one fuel point, not two. (In effect the
units that land pay one point to land, and those
that remain aloft pay one point to remain aloft.)
4.434 Intercept missions must pay a cost of three
additional fuel points to engage in air-to-air combat.
This cost does not apply to fi ghters in strike missions.
When a CAP mission is placed on the map to engage in
combat (4.34), the cost of three fuel points is deducted
from the initial fuel level as determined using the
Interception Fuel Level Table (4.35).
4.435 The fuel costs for movement and combat are
summarized on the US Fuel Expenditure Summary
(card 1, front).
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 10

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4.44 When an air mission’s fuel marker reaches zero,
it is replaced with a Fuel Critical marker. This marker is
moved one position higher on the track for each fuel
point expended. The mission is said to be “fuel critical,”
or “in a fuel critical state.”
EXAMPLE: An air mission has one fuel point
remaining, and is required to expend 3 points for
combat. It deducts one fuel point, reaching 0, and
replaces Fuel with Fuel Critical. It then advances
the Fuel Critical marker to the “2” box to account for
the other two points.
4.45 An air unit which is in a fuel critical state suffers
the following effects:
• The unit can move at most one hex per segment.
Each hex moved costs one more fuel point,
moving the marker one place higher on the track.
• The unit suffers adverse modifi ers in air-to-air
combat, both when the unit fi res and when it is
fi red on.
• The unit may crash on landing (4.451).
• The unit is eliminated if Fuel Critical reaches “7”
(4.454)
4.451 When an air mission that is fuel critical lands,
you must check each aircraft for possible ditching or
landing accidents. For each individual unit, roll one
die and consult the Safe Return Table (card 1, front).
Add to the die-roll the current value of the Fuel Critical
marker -- for example, if it is in the “5” box then you
add fi ve to each die roll). The result will either be no
effect (safe landing), or the loss of the unit.
• If the unit is unable to pay an additional fuel point
for landing (because of an extreme fuel critical
state) it suffers a modifi er of +2 on this roll.
• Note that there are modifi ers for night and dusk
conditions.
• Rolls for the Safe Return Table should be made
after all air unit movement for that segment is
complete.
other aircraft you might have intended to land on the
ship that phase need to either land somewhere else or
wait one more phase.)
4.452 (Optional) Deck Crashes: Each time
an air unit is eliminated by a die roll on
the Safe Return Table, roll one additional
die. On a roll of “10” there has been a
deck crash. Place a Deck Crash marker.
The carrier cannot conduct any fl ight operations
(launch, landing, or raising or lowering of aircraft)
while this marker is in place. (This implies that
other aircraft you might have intended to land on
the ship that phase need to either land somewhere
else or wait one more phase.)
4.453 Clearing Deck Crashes: At the end of each
Action Phase, roll one die for each Deck Crash marker.
The marker is removed on a roll of 1 through 7. This
includes the Action Phase in which the deck crash
occurred.
DESIGN NOTE: The Deck Crashes option can be added
to provide a little additional detail and color and a little
added challenge after you have some experience with
the game.
4.454 If a mission’s Fuel Critical marker reaches the “7”
box, all its aircraft are eliminated immediately.
Note that it is legal for the US player deliberately to
push missions beyond the point where they cannot
return safely.
DESIGN NOTE: The safe return result takes into
account both the possibility that the aircraft ran out
of fuel and ditched en route, and the possibility of a
landing accident (more likely when the aircraft is low on
fuel, and more likely in darkness or low light). Different
pilots had different levels of skill and training at coaxing
the most miles out of each gallon.
4.5 AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT
Air-to-air combat occurs:
• In the US Interception Segment, when a US
interception mission is located in the same hex
with a Japanese raid. This is called interception
combat.
• In the Japanese CAP Step of the US Air Attack
Segment, when a US strike has contacted a
carrier force. This is called strike combat. Each
strike will engage in at most one strike combat.
Note that air-to-air combat occurs only at these specifi c
times, and not when units move through each other’s
hexes during movement.
4.51 In interception combat, the following rules apply:
• The US player may intercept (i.e., engage in
air-to-air combat) with some, all, or none of the
intercept missions in a hex. He makes all the
decisions before rolling any dice.
• Each intercept mission resolves its air-to-air
combat separately, in the order the player wishes.
Each intercept mission may engage at most one
Japanese raid. It may not split its aircraft against
more than one raid.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA11

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• There is a fuel cost for interception combat. Each
mission that intercepts must immediately pay a
cost of three fuel points (4.434). A mission which
cannot pay the cost (because it is at a fuel critical
state of 4 or worse) cannot engage in interception
combat. For a CAP mission placed on the map,
the three points are deducted after determining
the mission’s initial fuel state (4.35).
4.52 In interception combat, a proportion of the air
points in the raid are fi ghters, and the rest are attack
planes. You determine how many points are fi ghters
the fi rst time a raid is contacted by US fi ghters (10.13).
• Combat against the Japanese escorts is resolved
before combat against the attack planes. The US
player apportions his aircraft between the two.
• At least one fi ghter unit per two Japanese escort
points must be allocated against escorts, before
allocating any against strike planes. If there is only
a single Japanese fi ghter point present, at least
one fi ghter unit must still engage it.
4.53 In strike combat, Japanese CAP is randomly
generated (5.4). All Japanese CAP points are fi ghters.
• The Japanese fi ghters will engage any escorting
American fi ghters on a one-for-two basis (i.e.,
one air point per two US escort units). If there are
any excess Japanese CAP points, they fi ght the
US attack planes. The two combats are resolved
separately.
• It is possible, as a result of the “A” combat result
(4.57), that some Japanese points will fi ght the
escorts and then also fi ght the attack planes.
• If there are no escorts, the number of Japanese
CAP points is doubled for purposes of the
Japanese Air-to-Air Combat Table. For example,
four CAP points would use the “8” column.
4.54 In both types of air-to-air combat, the fi ghters on
each side fi re. Only fi ghter units fi re, and all fi ghter
units participate. All fi re is simultaneous.
• US fi re is resolved using the US Air-to-Air Combat
Table (card 1, front). Cross-reference the number
of units fi ring with a die roll -- applying modifi ers
listed -- and read the number of Japanese air
points lost. The same table is used for fi ring
against fi ghters and strike planes, but there is a
die-roll modifi er when the target is fi ghters.
• Japanese fi ghters attack US planes using the
Japanese Air-to-Air Combat Table (card 1, front).
Locate the column heading corresponding to
the number of Japanese air points engaged.
Apply modifi ers as listed with the table and cross
reference the column with the modifi ed die roll to
read off the result.
• If the number of air units/points in one combat
should exceed the maximum column of the air-
to-air combat table, use that maximum column.
(This design limit refl ects the numbers of aircraft
that could be coordinated in one battle.)
4.55
US air-to-air combat results are a number of
Japanese air points destroyed. In interception combat,
results against escorts are separate from results against
attack planes; any excess against either is ignored, and
not applied to the other type.
4.56 Japanese air-to-air combat results are as follows:
A -- Abort result (4.57).
E -- one unit is immediately removed
A+E -- both the above results, one A and one E
2E -- two units are eliminated
For results against attack planes, if multiple types of
attack plane are present, choose randomly.
4.57 The A (Abort) result is applied according to the
combat situation:
• Versus US attack planes: One randomly chosen
unit is held out of the air attack and returned to the
Air Mission display.
• Versus escorting US fi ghters: one surviving CAP
point (if any) which engaged the escort may also
fi re at the attack planes.
• Versus intercepting US fi ghters: If this result is
achieved in the initial battle between US fi ghters
and Japanese escorts, then one surviving escort (if
any) can attack US fi ghters which were allocated
against the attack planes. This extra attack is
resolved before the battle involving the attack
planes. If this extra attack results in an A, then one
of the target fi ghters cannot shoot at the attack
planes
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 12

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5.0 AIR/SEA COMBAT
When carriers are battling carriers, there is only one
foolproof method of defense: to bomb the other
fellow’s fl ight decks before he can launch a strike. —
Samuel Eliot Morison
The rules of sections 5.1 through 5.6 apply to US air
strikes, which are the subject of Scenario 2.
Section 5.7 explains how to adapt these procedures for
Japanese air raids, which are needed in Scenario 3 and
after. Some other parts of these combat rules also do
not apply until later scenarios, but are included here for
easier reference. These are identifi ed by indicating the
scenarios to which they are applicable.
5.1 US AIR STRIKE ATTACK PROCEDURE
In the US Air Attack Segment, a US air strike may
attempt to attack detected Japanese forces in the
same hex. Only detected forces can be attacked. The
procedure is as follows. The individual steps are
identifi ed on the Game Turn Flow Chart.
1. Contact: Determine if the strike contacts its target
(5.2). If it does not, the rest of the procedure is
skipped. The strike must return to the task group
which launched it. If the contact succeeds, continue
with step 2.
2. Intelligence Level (Scenarios 4 and after): In
scenario 4 and after, increase the intelligence level
of the contacted force to the maximum (Level 4 for
carrier forces, Level 3 for surface forces). Promote
one level at a time, e.g., Level 1 to Level 2 and then
Level 2 to Level 3. Note: Intelligence level does not
apply in Scenario 2 or Scenario 3.
3. Commitment (Scenario 6 and after): Adjust
Commitment Index as required, if the target
increased in intelligence level (13.1).
4. Surprise: Determine whether the strike catches the
target by surprise (5.3).
5. Air-to-air Combat: Determine the strength of
Japanese CAP and resolve air-to-air combat (5.4).
6. Japanese Anti-aircraft Fire: Resolve the effects of
anti-aircraft fi re (5.5) Note, this step may be skipped
depending on the Surprise result.

7. Air-to-Ship combat: Resolve the attacks versus
ships (5.6).
5.2 CONTACT
A US air strike must contact a target force in order to
attack.
• A strike may make two contact attempts. Each
contact attempt is against a specifi c force (if there
is more than one in the hex, the US player chooses
one).
• A strike can contact a target only if the target is
detected (either Spotted, Located, or Approximate
Sighting, 8.1); an undetected force cannot be
contacted or attacked (except as a wrong target,
5.24). In scenario 2, all Japanese forces are
considered Located and can be contacted.
5.21 Resolve each contact attempt as follows:
1. On the Strike Contact Table (card 1, back), locate
the column corresponding to the distance from
the target force to the nearest US task group. (In
Scenario 2, this distance is taken to be 10 hexes.)
2. If the target is Approximate Sighting (instead of
Spotted or Located), there is a die-roll modifi er,
as listed on the chart. (In Scenario 2, all Japanese
forces are considered Located.)
3. Roll the die, apply listed modifi ers, and read the
result from the selected column.
4. If the contact attempt succeeds:
A. Flip the Air Strike counter to its reverse side,
indicating that it may not make further contact
attempts.
B. The target force becomes Spotted, if it was not
already.
5. If the contact attempt fails, see 5.22-5.23
5.22 If a strike’s fi rst contact attempt fails, it may
immediately make a second attempt. The strike must
expend one additional fuel point in order to make this
attempt. A -1 modifi er applies to the second contact
attempt. If there are two or more forces in the hex, the
second attempt can be against the same or a different
force, but not against a force in a different hex. (Note
that a false contact is not possible at this point because
strikes can only attempt to contact a detected force,
implying that the force is at least Level 1 and known to
not be a false contact.)
5.23 If both a strike’s contact attempts fail, fl ip the Air
Strike counter to its reverse side. It may not make
further contact attempts, and it must now return to its
carrier.
5.24 The result of W/2 is a wrong target. If there is a
different Japanese force -- detected or not -- available
within two hexes, the strike contacts that force instead.
(This is the only case in which a strike can end up
contacting a previously undetected force.)
• If more than one wrong target is available,
give preference to any detected force over an
undetected one. If there is still a choice, prefer the
target closer to the original hex; otherwise, choose
randomly.
• If no wrong target is available within two hexes,
treat the W/2 result as C.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA13

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5.25 In the event of a ‘W/2’ result, move the strike to the
hex containing the other force selected in 5.24.
• If the force was Level 0 (implying that it was
undetected), draw a Level 1 chit for it. If the force
turns out to be a False Contact, remove it. If there
is a second Japanese force in that same hex
(detected or not) the strike can use its second
contact attempt (5.22) to attempt to contact this
force.
• If the wrong target turns out to be anything other
than False Contact, the strike attacks it, even if it is
not a carrier force.
5.26 A result of W/0 is the same as W/2, but applies
only if there is another force in the same hex (not
two hexes); otherwise it is treated as a C against the
original target. If the wrong target turns out to be a
false contact, the strike can use its second contact
attempt (5.22) to attempt to contact the original target
in that hex.
DESIGN NOTE: Wrong target represents the aviators
chasing after some waves that look remarkably like ship
wakes, getting their radio communications confused,
and perhaps expending all their ordnance against
harmless ships. All these things happened numerous
times in the war.
5.3 SURPRISE
5.31 To determine effects of Surprise, roll the die and
consult the Surprise Table (card 1, back). The result
may modify Japanese CAP and AA die-rolls, or prohibit
CAP and/or AA combat altogether.
5.32 The die roll is modifi ed (as listed on the table)
if the force has a US Advantage marker or has not
launched any air raid so far in the game. These
modifi ers are cumulative.
5.33 Surprise applies only to strikes against carrier
forces.
5.34 If multiple strikes attack the same target in
the same Air Attack Segment, determine surprise
separately for each strike.
DESIGN NOTE: Surprise applies only to carrier forces
because it represents having aircraft and/or fuel and
munitions in vulnerable locations on the ship, and
perhaps having no CAP in place. It is possible for two
strikes to arrive just minutes apart (i.e., the same Air
Attack Segment) and the second one achieves surprise
while the fi rst does not; this happened at Midway.
5.4 JAPANESE CAP
5.41 In Scenario 6 and after, use the following
procedure to determine the strength of Japanese
defensive fi ghters (CAP). (In earlier scenarios the
strength of Japanese CAP is fi xed by scenario; you do
not need this rule.)
1. Determine the target force’s net air value. This is
the printed air value minus the number of points
currently unavailable (9.25).
2. Locate the corresponding column of the Japanese
CAP Strength Table (card 2, front).
3. Roll the die, and if the Japanese force was
surprised (5.3) apply the modifi er from the Surprise
Table.
4. Cross reference the die roll with the column and
read the result, which is the number of air points
of Japanese CAP. (Note that CAP can appear even
if the net air value is 0, and 2 points of CAP can
appear even if the net air value is 1; air value is
only what you know, not a precise count.)
5.42 The Japanese CAP immediately attacks the strike
using the air-to-air combat procedure (4.5). US fi ghters
escorting the strike fi re back, subtracting one from their
die rolls. Place any Japanese air points eliminated in
this combat into the force’s Lost box.
5.43 If more than one strike contacts the force in the
same phase, generate CAP only when the fi rst one
arrives. The same CAP fi ghts all strikes arriving in that
phase. Air points eliminated in combat with one strike
do not fi ght later strikes.
5.44 After all strikes arriving in the phase have
concluded CAP combat, return any surviving CAP to
the pile of unused counters; they count neither as
“lost” nor as “unavailable.” CAP is generated again
each time it is needed.
5.5 ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE
Anti-aircraft fi re is resolved during each side’s Air
Attack Segment. The rules of this section apply to both
US and Japanese fi re, with differences as noted.
5.51 To resolve anti-aircraft fire:
1. Total the A. A. values (printed on ship counters at
upper left; see page 5) of all ships fi ring from the
target force or task group.
a. In US attacks, if the Surprise Table result (5.31)
was “Complete Surprise,” there is no Japanese
AA fi re; the rest of the procedure is skipped.
b. In US attacks, if the Surprise Table result was
“Partial Surprise,” the total value is halved,
dropping fractions.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 14

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2. On the Anti-aircraft Fire Table (card 2, front), locate
the highest column whose value does not exceed
the total number of factors fi ring. If the adjusted
total A.A. value is less than 10, the A.A. has no
effect.
3. Roll the die and cross reference with the column to
fi nd a result.
4. Japanese AA results are the number of US air units
aborted/eliminated.
a. Aborted air units remain in play and may
return to their carrier or base, but they do not
participate in the air-to-ship attack.
b. Eliminated units are removed from play
immediately.
c. In each case choose affected units randomly
from the attack planes (SB2C, SBD, TBF, and
TBM). Note that AA fi re affects only attack
planes, not escorting fi ghters.
5. US AA results are the number of Japanese air points
aborted/eliminated. Aborted points do not take part
in the ensuing ait-to-ship attack. Eliminated air points
are placed in the Lost box of the raid’s Butai display.
DESIGN NOTE: The ‘abort’ result does not mean the
planes turn around and abandon the attack; this did not
happen. It means their aim is spoiled so their attacks
have no effect.
Players of the original Carrier game should note that in this game all ships are allowed to fi re. The antiaircraft
values and table take into account that not all ships are
likely to have a good shot.
5.6 AIR-TO-SHIP ATTACKS
Air-to-ship attacks are resolved during each side’s Air
Attack Segment. The rules of this section apply to both
US and Japanese attacks, with differences as noted.
5.61 Air-to-ship attacks use a two-part procedure in
which you fi rst determine a number of die rolls you
get to make for damage, and then make those rolls to
determine the actual damage infl icted.
The procedure is as follows:
1. Total the attack values for all air units in the strike.
US air units have their attack values printed at
upper right (see rules page 5, top). Look up the
corresponding result on the Air Attack Die Rolls
chart (Card 2, front).
a. If there was no air-to-air combat between the
attacking unit and either CAP or intercept
missions, the force’s total attack strength is
doubled. Note that this will always apply to
US attacks on a Japanese surface force; this is
intended.
2. A US air strike must immediately expend one extra
fuel point, or else the US player must shift one
column left. (This represents time to coordinate
the attack.)
3. The result indicates how many damage die rolls
the strike is allowed, and a die roll modifi er (which
may be 0) for each. It can happen that different
rolls are assigned different modifi ers.
4. Each damage die roll is assigned an individual ship
target. All the rolls need to be assigned to targets
before any die rolls are made.
a. For US attacks, the player can assign rolls
however he likes.
b. For Japanese attacks, assign each damage roll
to a randomly chosen carrier. CVs and CVLs
are treated equally (assigned equal chances)
for this purpose. (Exception: In the Great
Carrier Battle of the Pacifi c scenario, Japanese
naval air points will attack CVs in preference to
CVLs.) If no carriers are present the Japanese
will attack battleships (BB) if any are present;
otherwise, choose randomly.
5. Roll the die the specifi ed number of times
(applying modifi ers listed) and consult the Air
Attack Damage Table (card 2, front) to determine
the number of hits on each target ship. (See 12.0
for damage effects.)
DESIGN NOTE: You might expect that Japanese planes
would attack big carriers (CVs) in preference to smaller
ones (CVLs), but this does not seem to have been the
case either at Philippine Sea or at Leyte Gulf; in both
battles attacks were made on CVLs even when CVs
were nearby. This may have been another effect of the
poor Japanese pilot training at this stage of the war.
In the hypothetical Great Carrier Battle of the Pacifi c
scenario, the Japanese pilots will ‘get the big ones fi rst.’
5.7 JAPANESE AIR RAID ATTACK PROCEDURE
DESIGN NOTE: The Japanese fl iers at the
Philippine Sea were less well trained than the more
experienced pilots of earlier battles. They did not
organize their attacks the best way possible, and
they allowed themselves to be diverted from hitting
the carriers to attack the US battle line instead.
The rules of this section refl ect these realities.
This section of rules describes the procedure when
Japanese air raids attack US task groups. Note that
these rules are put here for continuity, but are not
needed until scenario 3.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA15

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Japanese air-to-sea attacks occur during the Japanese
Air Attack Segment. Attacks are resolved one raid at a
time.
Note that air-to-air combat against US interception
missions (including CAP) will have been resolved in the
immediately preceding US Interception Segment.
5.71 For each Japanese air raid that has reached its
target, carry out the following procedure. If more than
one raid has reached the same target, resolve them in
random order. Separate raids attack separately.
1. If the hex contains Task Group 58.7 (“Battle Line”),
roll the die and consult the Japanese Action vs.
Battle Line Table (card 2, front) to determine the
Japanese action. The possible results are Divert,
Overfl y, and Avoid (5.72).
2. If a Divert result was obtained in Step 4, the
Japanese will attack TG 58.7. Otherwise,
randomly select a carrier task group to be the
target of the attack.
3. US ships in the randomly chosen target task group
(only) use the Anti-aircraft Fire Table as described
in 5.5.
4. Resolve air vs. ship attacks (5.75)
5.72 The results on the Japanese Action vs. Battle Line
Table are as follows:
• Divert: Japanese planes attack the Battle Line
instead of the carriers. Ships in Battle Line fi re AA
according to 5.73.
• Overfly: Japanese planes overfl y the Battle Line
on their way to attack the carriers. They suffer
AA fi re from the battleships (BB) in Battle Line in
addition to normal AA fi re from whatever carrier
task group they attack. The Battle Line BBs fi re
with half the normal AA value (total all, then halve,
dropping any fraction). Each hit is applied against
a randomly chosen point of the strike, fi ghters
included (i.e., fi ghters are affected on an equal
basis with attack planes, as all are fl ying over). The
Battle Line AA is in addition to normal AA and is
resolved separately.
• Avoid: Japanese planes avoid Battle Line
altogether. They attack a carrier task group. Ships
in TG 58.7 do not participate.
DESIGN NOTE: AA values are halved in the
‘overfl y’ case because the overfl ying units would
be at greater range than if they were attacking the
fi ring ships, and also moving laterally, a harder
shot.
5.721 If multiple raids overfl y Battle Line in the same
Action Phase, each BB can fi re against only one
overfl ying raid. The US player decides when each ship
will fi re. Flip a ship over after it fi res. All the ships are
unfl ipped after all raids have been resolved. A fl ipped-
over ship can still fi re against any planes that attack
Battle Line itself.
5.73 Anti-aircraft fi re by attacked task group:
• The procedure of section 5.5 is used.
• Only units in the attacked task group fi
re, not the
other task groups.
• For convenience, the scenario instructions list the
starting AA total for each US task group. This total
will change only if the Japanese score hits on
some of the ships.
• Results are interpreted as a number of air points
aborted/eliminated.
• Aborted points remain in the air raid box and
may return to their carrier or base, but do not
contribute to the fi nal attack die rolls.
• Eliminated points are placed in the Lost box of the
Butai display immediately.
5.74 The rules for Contact and Surprise do not apply to
Japanese strikes.
5.75 Japanese air-to-ship attacks are resolved
using the same basic procedure as US attacks (5.6).
Japanese naval air points have an attack strength
of 4. Exception: If you are playing the Great Carrier
Battle of the Pacifi c scenario, this is raised to 5 for
Japanese naval air points (only). Japanese land air
points have an attack strength of 3 in all scenarios.
DESIGN NOTE: The Japanese attack values take into
account the likely mix of torpedo planes and dive
bombers. On the American side, the values presume
that torpedoes and divers are used in combination as
this is nearly always the case in play. US attack values
also take into account the various munitions carried
by US torpedo bombers (some carried bombs). The
SBD has a better attack value than the SB2C it was
slated to replace, refl ecting the common opinion of
American airmen who preferred the former type to its
successor, which had many developmental troubles.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 16

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6.0 TASK GROUPS AND CARRIER
OPERATIONS
6.1 TASK GROUP DISPLAY
The Task Group display holds US ship and air units.
These units are never placed on the map but are held
on the task Group display (and in the case of air units,
on the Air Mission display or in air searches).
6.11 Each Task Group display is identifi ed by number
(e.g., 58.1) which is printed on the corresponding Task
Group counter.
6.12 As per scenario instructions, ship counters are
placed on the display and the Task Group counter
is placed on the map. Any number of Task Group
counters can occupy the same hex.
• You can use the Task Force 58 counter as a
replacement for multiple TG counters in the same
hex, and move TF 58 like a single task group. (In
the actual battle, all the task groups remained
together as a single task force.)
• The TF 58 hex sometimes gets crowded with air
units. You can use the “Task Force 58 In Hex” box
on the mapsheet as a holding box.
6.13 Each carrier unit is placed in one of the individual
carrier boxes used to track its air operations. Note
that in most scenarios Task Group 58.4 has only three
carriers. Its fourth slot is used in the Great Carrier Battle
of the Pacifi c scenario.
6.14 All surface ship units in a carrier task group are
placed in the TG’s Screen box.
6.15 Units may not transfer from one task group to
another once play has started. Exception: Battleships
and other surface units may be detached from Battle
Line (TG 58.7) and put into a separate surface task
group at any time. There are three extra “Surf TG”
markers for this purpose. The special functions of
Battle Line pertain only to TG 58.7, not to any detached
forces. Such detachment is a one-way operation; task
groups may not be recombined.
6.2 AIR OPERATIONS
DESIGN NOTE: Managing your fl ight decks is one
of the central challenges in the game. How many
planes of what type should be readied, when? If too
few fi ghters are readied, there may not be enough
to deal with incoming raids. If too few attack planes
are readied, there may not be enough to strike at
targets when they appear. If attack planes are readied
but no targets are found, you risk being caught
with those planes on the deck, a potential disaster.
6.21 The planes on each carrier are held in that carrier’s
column of the display. Each display has the following
parts:
6.22 Occupancy Limits: The Carrier Operations Limit
Chart states limits on how many air units can occupy
certain boxes at any one time or at the end of the Air
Operations Phase. These limits are per carrier and
are different for CVs versus CVLs. All air units count
one against these limits regardless of type. (Note that,
unlike the Carrier game, air units are unitary wholes;
there are no ‘steps.’)
• The ‘Flight Deck” limit refers to the sum of Ready
plus Landing aircraft; all of these are on the fl ight
deck. The words “fl ight deck” appear in both
boxes as a reminder.
• The number of unts in the Servicing box at any
time cannot exceed the “Servicing” limit.
• The ‘Hangar/Total’ limit refers to all air units in any
box on the carrier. This is the maximum number
of units the carrier may have aboard. They can all
be in the Hangar if desired.
There are other limits on how many units can perform
certain operations per phase; see 6.23.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA17

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6.23 During the Carrier Operations Phase, the US player
may perform the following operations, in order.
1. Launch any Ready aircraft, subject to Launch
Occupancy limits
2. Raise aircraft from Servicing to Ready, subject to
Flight Deck limits
3. Move aircraft from Hangar into Servicing, or from
Servicing back to Hangar, subject to Servicing
limits.
4. Lower any aircraft on the fl ight deck, subject to
Lowering limits.
5. Land any aircraft from air missions in the same
hex, subject to Flight Deck limits, on any carrier
that did not launch aircraft in this same Air
Operations Segment.
There are limits to the number of air units which can
be involved in each plane handling operation on each
carrier per US Air Operations Phase. These limits are
explained in the following paragraphs and summarized
on the Carrier Operations Limits Chart. A carrier cannot
conduct any air operations while on fi re (12.3).
6.24 Launch: Units launched are moved from the
Ready box and placed either in an air mission or a
search mission.
• Units can be launched only if the total number
of units, then occupying the fl ight deck at that
moment does not exceed the Launch Occupancy
Limit (see chart). Some, all, or none of the Ready
units can be launched. (Exception: Leeward
movement, rule 17.0.)
• The number of units launched per phase cannot
exceed the Launch limit.
• If a Search segment (8.2) immediately preceded
this Air Operations Segment, any units launched
on Search count against the Launch limit for the
current segment.
6.25 Raising: Planes moved from Servicing to Ready
are said to be “raised.” Any units in Servicing can be
raised subject to Flight Deck limits, which are in force at
all times.
6.26 Servicing: Planes can be moved from Hangar into
Servicing or in the opposite direction, from Servicing to
Hangar. Each unit so moved (in either direction) counts
one against the Servicing Limit.

• At the end of the Air Operations Segment, the
number of units in the Servicing box also cannot
exceed the Servicing limit. In other words, you
cannot accumulate planes in Servicing. Servicing is
both an occupancy and an operations limit.
6.27 Lowering: Planes may be moved from Landed to
Hangar, or from Ready to Servicing. In each case they
are said to be “lowered.” The total number of units
lowered cannot exceed the Lowering limit.
• A unit lowered from the Landed box always goes
to the Hangar, not directly to Servicing.
• A unit lowered from the Ready box always
goes to Servicing, not directly to the Hangar.
DESIGN NOTE: Before a ready plane could be
returned to the hangar space, it had to be de-armed
and de-fueled, which was about as time-consuming
an operation as arming and fueling. In the actual
battle, American strike planes on the carrier decks
were simply fl own off when the fi rst Japanese
strike was detected. After orbiting to the east for
a time, they ‘unloaded’ their ordnance over Guam.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 18

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6.28 Landing: Units being landed are moved from the
Air Mission display or search mission to the Landing
box of a carrier in the same hex. Units can land on
any carrier -- it does not matter from which one they
launched.
• Aircraft pay one extra fuel point to land (4.433).
• Units that are fuel critical must check for loss when
landing (4.451)
• The Flight Deck Limit is in effect at all times. A unit
cannot be landed if the total number of units in the
Landed box plus the total in the Ready box would
exceed the Flight Deck Limit.
• The number of units landed per phase cannot
exceed the Landing limit (same as the Launch
limit).
• Units cannot be landed if any units were launched
from that carrier in that Air Operations Segment,
regardless of fl ight deck limits. You may wish
to invert any carrier that launches planes in the
launch step, as a reminder that it cannot land any
in that same Air Operations Segment. One carrier
in a task group can launch planes while another
lands them.
• An air mission need not land immediately on
reaching the carrier’s hex. It can remain in the air
waiting for room on the fl ight deck, burning one fuel
point per Air Movement Segment per rule 4.431.
DESIGN NOTE: When a wave of aircraft was
launched, planes would wait on the after section
of the deck, blocking the space used for landing.
Modern carriers use the angled fl ight deck (introduced
in 1953) and catapults to avoid this problem.
6.29 The total number of air units on a carrier cannot
exceed the carrier’s Hangar/Total limit. This is also the
limit on the number in the Hangar.
6.291 Players may voluntarily eliminate Landed units
(not Ready units) on the Flight Deck at any time.
For victory point purposes these units count the
same as units ditched in the hex of the Task Group.
DESIGN NOTE: Units voluntarily eliminated have been
pushed over the side. The pilots, however, are not
pushed over the side, hence the reduced victory point
effect. To do this with armed and fuelled aircraft (Ready
aircraft) would pose too much danger to the ship.
6.3 US MOVEMENT
Note: This rules section is placed here for continuity
and for easier reference during play, but it is not
needed until Scenario 5. You can skip it until then.
6.31 US ships are organized into fi ve task groups (four
carriers and one surface), which together make up Task
Force 58. In all scenario setups, the US begins with the
Task Force 58 counter, which represents all the task
groups in its hex.
6.32 Movement of all US task forces / task groups
occurs when the US Move chit is drawn. This is the
only point in the turn at which they can be moved.
6.33 The US player may detach individual task groups
from Task Force 58 at the same time as movement. He
places a detached task group counter on the map. A
task group may rejoin Task Force 58 any time the two
end their moves in the same hex.
6.34 A task force or task group may move one hex each
time it moves. A task force or task group containing
carriers cannot enter island hexes (light blue).
6.35 A US task force or task group can enter a hex
occupied by a Japanese force only when using rule
21.0.
6.36 When a task force or task group moves, any air
raids, air strikes, or intercept missions on the map
remain behind in the hex; they do not accompany it.
CAP missions do, as they are on the task force display
and not the map.
6.4 DUSK/NIGHT RECOVERY AND
ILLUMINATION
“Bald Eagle, this is Blue Jacket himself. Turn on the
lights.” — Admiral Marc Mitscher, 2030 pm, June 20,
1944
Note: This rules section is placed here for continuity
and for easier reference during play, but it is not
needed until Scenario 5.
6.41 The second and third Action Phases of the 1850
game turn each day are Dusk. The fourth Action Phase
of that turn is Night, as are all turns from 2010 through
0410 inclusive. The fi rst Action Phase of the 1850 turn,
and all turns from 0520 through 1730, are day.
6.42 Whenever non-night-rated units land on a dusk or
night turn, and the hex is not illuminated (6.43), then
(regardless of fuel state) the US player must roll one
die for each such unit, applying modifi ers for night or
dusk as usual, and consult the Safe Return Table (card
1, back), applying results immediately. If the mission
is also fuel critical then those modifi ers are applied as
well.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA19

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6.43 Illumination: The US player may
declare during any US Air Operations
Segment that he is ‘turning on the lights’ for
any task group or task force. Place an
Illumination marker in the hex.
6.431 If lights are turned on for any task group in a
hex, they are considered turned on for all. You can’t
illuminate one task group in a hex and leave another
dark.
6.432 Units landing in an illuminated hex must check
the Safe Return Table only if they are fuel critical.
6.433 In the Japanese Submarine Attack step of the
End Phase:
1. The US player must make a submarine attack
die roll (14.2) against any task group currently
illuminated.
2. The US player may turn off lights (removing
the illumination marker) if desired. (Note that this
follows the potential submarine attack -- thus, any
time the US player turns on lights the Japanese
submarines get at least one chance to attack.)
DESIGN NOTE: Admiral Mitscher’s order to “turn on
the lights” to help his tired fl iers get home is the most
famous incident of this battle. The ‘lights’ included
searchlights, beacons, and star shell, and thus lit up
the surrounding ocean to a considerable distance.
7.0 JAPANESE FORCES
Japanese units arrive in the game as Force counters.
Each force is at a specifi c Intelligence Level, from 0 to
4, at all times. The intelligence level refl ects how much
information you have about the force and how reliable
that information is. All forces arrive initially at level 0,
meaning that you know nothing: it could be a carrier
task force, or it could be a false report. As you contact
the enemy forces -- or as they contact you -- the
forces increase in level, meaning that your knowledge
improves. If you lose contact, your knowledge may
decline. The heart of the game is fi guring out how
best to use your aircraft in this situation of limited and
imperfect knowledge.
DESIGN NOTE: Your initial knowledge of Level 0
forces represents information gained through radio
direction fi nding (HF/DF), code breaking, submarines,
and long-range aircraft (PBM Mariner fl ying boats and
B-24 Liberators). You obtain more detailed information
primarily through air search with your carrier aircraft.
7.1 JAPANESE FORCE ARRIVAL
In the Arrival Phase of each game-turn, one-third of the
Japanese forces not currently in play (rounded down)
will arrive on the map. (Count all lettered Force markers
not in use, but not Butai markers.) Exception: If only
one or two Japanese force markers are not in use, one
of them arrives.
7.11 Begin by selecting the required number of force
counters. (It does not matter which letters.) Select
the corresponding activation chits to be placed in the
activation chit cup (3.23).
7.12 Each force arrives randomly in one of the four
Arrival Zones printed on the map. For each arriving
force, carry out the following procedure:
1. Using the Japanese Arrival Table (printed on the
map), roll the die and read the result to determine
the Arrival Zone (7.13) in which the force arrives.
2. Roll the die again to determine the specifi c arrival
hex in that zone (7.14).
3. If some force already arrived in that hex this turn,
choose randomly from among the unoccupied
hexes in that Arrival Zone.
4. If there is a US carrier task group within six hexes,
see 7.15.
5. Place the new force on the map and place its
activation chit in the Sequence Cup.
7.13 There are four Arrival Zones on the map.
Counterclockwise from top of map to bottom, these are
Zone I, Zone II, Zone III, and Zone IV. Each Arrival Zone
consists of a group of hexes numbered 1 through 10.
7.14 Each result on the Japanese Arrival Table specifi es
a zone. Each zone has ten arrival hexes. Determine
the exact hex by rolling the die again and locating the
corresponding number hex within the specifi ed zone.
7.15 If there is a US carrier task group within six hexes
of a selected arrival hex, roll one die and proceed
accordingly:
1-3 — Re-roll on the Arrival Table until you select a
different zone, then repeat 7.14.
4-8 — Roll again to select a different hex in the same
zone and place the force there (even if within 6
hexes of a US carrier).
9-10 — Place the force in the original arrival hex (the
carrier task group has no effect)
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 20

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These outcomes are printed with the Japanese Arrival
Table.
7.2 JAPANESE FORCE MOVEMENT
DESIGN NOTE: Japanese forces in general are trying
to move toward Saipan and attack the invasion fl eet.
Carrier forces, when they engage US carriers, will draw
off to what they consider an optimum range -- except
in some cases they will move instead toward Saipan
and try to do an “end run” around the US fl eet, a
possibility that worried Admiral Spruance.
Each Japanese force moves when its Activation Chit is drawn.
7.21 A Japanese force moves by the following rules, in
order of priority. (These rules are listed for reference
in a chart on the reverse side of the Japanese Air Raid
Flow Chart.)
1. If retiring (rule 19), the force uses Retirement
Movement (19.2).
2. If located in the Invasion Zone (between Saipan/
Tinian and the east map edge), use Mission
Movement (7.22).
3. If adjacent to or stacked with a US task group, and
not located in the Invasion Zone, see 7.24.
4. If it is a surface force:
a. if there is a crippled US ship within six hexes,
move toward it (see 12.45)
b. Otherwise, use Mission Movement (7.22).
5. If it is a force of unknown type (this includes all
Level 0 forces, as well as Level 1 Large, Medium
and Small), then use Mission Movement (7.22).
6. If it is a carrier force (Level 1 Carrier, or Level 2
or higher known to have carriers), and has not
launched any air raids up to that point in the game
(i.e., has no air points on its Butai display), then
use Mission Movement (7.22).
7. If it is a carrier force that has launched an air raid at
some point in the game (i.e., has air points on its
Butai display), then proceed as follows:
a. If located 15 or more hexes distant from all US
carrier task groups, use Mission Movement
(7.22).
b. If located 8 or fewer hexes distant from a US
carrier task group, move one hex further away
from that task group. When choosing the hex,
give preference to hexes further east; otherwise
choose randomly.
c. If located 9 hexes distant from a US carrier task
group, do not move.
d. If located 10-14 hexes distant from the nearest
US carrier, and in a eastern map zone, use
Mission Movement (7.22). The red line that
zig-zags down the middle of the map divides
eastern map zones from western ones.
e. If located 10-14 hexes distant from all US
carriers, and in a western map zone, move
directly toward the nearest US task group with
carriers.
Note that Japanese carrier forces consider only US
carrier task groups in their movement decisions. They
ignore surface-only task groups.
7.22 Mission Movement: The map is divided up into
Mission Movement Zones, each with its own Mission
Movement Compass, showing different directions
labelled with die-roll values 1 through 10.
7.221 At the start of each Activation Segment you make
a single Mission Movement die roll. This value is used
for all mission movement in that segment. When a
force uses Mission Movement, locate the compass arm
corresponding to the current Mission Movement die
roll for the zone in which the force is located, and move
the force one hex in that direction.
7.222 Except as described in 7.23, forces do not exit
the map using Mission Movement. A force at the map
edge which is directed to move off map will move
along the map edge instead, in whatever direction is
closest to the intended move.
7.23 A Japanese force in the Invasion Zone (between
Saipan/Tinian and the east map edge) always uses
Mission Movement. The Mission Movement in this
zone will attempt to move the force due east toward
the map edge. If it starts adjacent to the map edge
it exits the map, which awards victory points to the
Japanese (15.0). Once a Japanese force has exited, it
does not return.
7.231 If a Japanese force is in the Invasion Zone and a
US task group occupies the next hex located due east,
then move either northeast or southeast (into one of
the two possible hexes adjacent to the preferred one),
choosing randomly.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA21

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7.24 If a Japanese force is activated while adjacent
to US units, and not in the Invasion Zone, proceed as
follows. (Note: this is extremely rare; you can wait to
read this rule until you need it.)
1. If you are using rule 21.0 (Surface Combat), then
the Japanese force moves into the US force’s hex
(possibly bringing about surface combat) if any of
the following is true:
a. This is a surface force (of any size) and the US
units include a crippled ship;
b. This is a Large Level 2 surface force, or a Level
3 surface force containing a battleship;
c. It is Night, and the force is either a Medium
Level 2 surface force or a Level 3 force
containing a cruiser unit.
2. If you are not using rule 21.0, or none of the
cases described in 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c) holds, then
the Japanese force uses Mission Movement,
but never into the US-occupied hex. If Mission
Movement dictates a move into the US-occupied
hex, the Japanese force does not move. Note that
when not using rule 21.0, neither side can enter a
hex occupied by an enemy force or task group.
DESIGN NOTE: Part (1) says that the Japanese will
always try to mop up crippled ships, that a large
Japanese force with battleships will try to engage either
day or night, and that a cruiser/destroyer force will try
to engage at night.
7.25 Japanese forces can enter island hexes as well as
open sea.
7.3 INTELLIGENCE LEVELS
Each Japanese force is assigned an Intelligence Level,
0 through 4, at all times. The intelligence chits are used
to record intelligence level.
• Rules 7.31-7.33 explain the meanings of the
different levels.
• Rules 7.34-7.39 explain how forces progress to
higher levels.
7.31 A force is at Level 0 when initially placed
on the map. This state is represented by the
force having no chit. At this point you do not
know what ships the force might have or even
whether it is real.
7.32 A Level 1 force is denoted by a Level 1 intelligence
chit identifying it as one of the following: “Carrier,”
“Surface,” “Small,” “Medium,” or “Large.” A “Carrier”
force is known to include at least one carrier. A
“Surface” force is most likely surface ships, although
there is a chance it may turn out to have a carrier. The
other three types may or may not have carriers.
7.33 At Level 2 and higher, you know defi nitely whether
a force has carriers (“carrier force”) or is composed
only of surface ships (“surface force”).
7.331 Carrier forces:
• At Level 2 and Level 3, a carrier force receives an
intelligence chit denoting approximate numbers of
carriers. These may turn out to be incorrect, and
you do not yet know the actual ships.
• At Level 4, a carrier force receives its actual carriers
and their screen. (See 7.4 for progression of carrier
forces to level 4.)
7.332 Surface forces:
• A Level 2 surface force receives a Level 2
intelligence chit identifying it as “large[-sized]
surface,” “medium surface,” or “small surface.”
• When a surface force progresses to Level 3, it
receives its actual ships. These will consist of
either a ‘cruiser force’ or a ‘destroyer force’ plus
possibly one or more battleships. These are placed
underneath the force counter.
• Surface forces do not have a Level 4.
7.34 Forces progress from one level to the next at the
following times:
• A force at Level 0 will progress to Level 1 and
receive a Level 1 chit (7.32) when any successful
search result (L, S, or ?) is obtained against it
(8.341). Note that an “S, chit+1” result against a
Level 0 force is treated simply as “S.”.
• A force at Level 1 or higher, but less than the
maximum (Level 4 for carrier, Level 3 for surface)
will progress to the next higher level and receive
a new chit whenever a “S, chit+1” search result is
obtained against it (8.342).
• A force immediately progresses to the maximum
possible level (Level 4 for carriers, Level 3 for
surface), no matter what level it is currently at,
when contacted by a US air strike (5.2), or when
it engages in surface combat (21.0). (A force can
also reach the maximum level as a result of normal
progression from one level to the next, per the
other bullet points of this rule.)
• A force at Level 0 or 1 may progress to Level 2 and
receive a new chit as part of the air raid procedure
(10.1C). In this case, a force may progress two
levels, from Level 0 to Level 2, at the same time.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 22

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• A force contacted by a US air strike, or which
engages in surface combat, immediately increases
to the maximum level (level 4 for carriers, level
3 for surface). This is done one level at a time,
progressing through successive levels as described
in 7.37, 7.38, and 7.41.
Note: In Scenario 6 and after, the discovery of a new
carrier force or the progression of an existing one to a
higher level affects the Japanese Commitment Index
(13.1).
7.35 When a Level 0 force progresses to Level 1, the
Level 1 chit is drawn randomly from a cup. When
setting up the game, all the Level 1 force chits are
placed in a cup for drawing. (Include the “Double
Force” chits only if using rule 7.5.)
• If the chit reads “False Contact,” remove the
force from the map and place it back in the pile of
available force counters. Set the Level 1 chit aside;
it is not replaced in the cup. As the name implies,
this turned out not to be a real force.
• If the chit is anything other than “False Contact”,
place it beneath the force counter. (It may be
examined at any time.) This is most likely a real
force, albeit you do not yet know much about it.
7.36 Whenever a Level 1 force progresses to Level 2,
the Level 2 chit is determined using the Level 1 to Level
2 Intelligence Table (card 3, front). On this table there
is one column for each possible Level 1 chit. Cross-
reference the existing chit with a die roll to obtain the
new chit. Place the new Level 2 chit and set the old
Level 1 chit aside (it is not replaced in the cup).
• There are die-roll modifi ers for Known Air Strength
(9.24). These apply only in Scenario 5 (where rule
9.24 is introduced) and after. They apply only if
the strength is known; if the force’s air strength is
unknown, there is no modifi er.
• The outcome can be either a carrier force with
an approximate number of carriers, or a large,
medium, or small surface force.
DESIGN NOTE: As you will learn in rule 9.24, Known
Air Strength is a measure of how many air points the
force had at the start of the battle. The purpose of the
modifi er is to make the next Intelligence Chit more
consistent with what you know about the air strength. If
a force has launched a large number of aircraft at you,
it is more likely to be a strong force.
EXAMPLE: A level 1 carrier force previously
launched an air raid totaling nine air points; its
known air strength is nine (9.24). You search it and
receive a “L, chit+1” result which causes it to be
promoted to Level 2. You will use the “Level 1 Carri-
er” column of the Level 1 to Level 2 Intelligence Ta-
ble. The list of Known Air Strength Modifi ers shows
that a -1 modifi er applies for the known air strength
of nine. The die roll is 6, modifi ed to 5. This produc-
es a “2-3 Carrier” result. You replace the Level 1 chit
with a “Level 2 2-3 CV.” The Level 1 chit is set aside.
Note that at level 2, the term “CV” is used for all
carriers; CVs are not distinguished from CVLs. This
is not the case at Level 3.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA23

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7.37 Level 2 carrier forces progress to Level 3 using the
Level 2 to Level 3 Carrier Forces Table (card 3, front).
This table is divided into four major sections according
to which Level 2 chit the force currently possesses (e.g.
“L2 1-2 Carriers.”) Each of these sections is further
divided into several rows according to the force’s
current Known Air Strength (9.24). Select the correct
row, roll the die (a modifi er applies in scenario 9, only),
fi nd the die roll in that row, and read the result from the
top of the table. The results are listed in a row at the
top: Number of CVs/Number of CVLs.
• One row on each table is printed in bold and
includes the label “Unknown.” It is used for forces
that have not yet revealed any air points, as well
as for certain values of known air strength. In
Scenario 4, use this row in all cases.
• There are no die-roll modifi ers on this table.
7.38 The Level 2 to Level 3 Carrier Forces Table result
specifi es which Level 3 chit to apply: for example, “4/2”
equates to “4 CV + 2 CVL.”
• If the required chit for a table outcome is not
available, you may replace it with one that differs
as little as possible from the required chit, using a
die roll to resolve any ties.
EXAMPLE: A force is currently “L2 1-2 CV.” It has
unknown air strength. You will use the topmost section
of the L2 to L3 Carrier Forces Table. Since the force’s
air strength is unknown you will use the row labelled
“Unknown or 6-7” which you would also use if it had a
known air strength of 6 or 7. The die roll is 5. Reading
from the selected row, a roll of 4-9 yields the result
“0/2”, 0 CVs and 2 CVLs. As shown in this example, CVs
are distinguished from CVLs at Level 3, refl ecting more
precise knowledge of the Japanese forces.
7.39 A Level 2 surface force is promoted to Level 3 using
the Level 2 to Level 3 Surface Forces Table (card 3, front).
You cross-reference a die roll (there are no modifi ers) with
the force’s current Level 2 chit. Results are as follows:
DD — the force becomes a destroyer force. Draw one
Destroyer Force chit from the pool of available chits,
and replace the Level 2 chit with this one.
CA — Cruiser force. Same as for DD, but use the Cruiser
Force chits.
CA2+ — Choose two cruiser chits, and use the one with
the larger numeric values.
CA2- — Choose two cruiser chits, and use the one with
the smaller numeric values.
BB + CA — The force consists of one battleship plus a
cruiser force. Draw one BB counter randomly from
those available, and one Cruiser Force. If all available
Japanese battleships are already in play, then further
‘BB’ results are ignored; just apply the ‘CA’ portion.
2BB, 3 BB, 4 BB — same as BB + CA, but draw 2, 3, or 4
battleships respectively.
The ship/surface units drawn for a Level 3 force are
placed directly underneath the force counter, on the map.
The force then retains the assigned unit(s) for the rest of
the game, unless they are sunk. The maximum level for a
surface force is Level 3.
EXAMPLE: A level 2 large surface force is searched
and a “S, chit+1” result obtained. The force is
promoted to Level 3. The die roll is 5, for a result
of “BB + CA.” Draw one battleship and one Cruiser
Force unit from those not in play. Note that as
with carriers, some battleships are classifi ed as
Additional Ships and others as Ghost ships, and
may not be available depending on what option you
have chosen. (See 2.35.)
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 24

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7.4 LEVEL 4 CARRIER FORCES
When a carrier force progresses to Level 4, you
determine its actual aircraft carriers and their screen.
• In Scenario 5 and after, you put the ships in the
Ships box of the force’s Butai display (9.1).
• In Scenario 4, you score victory points for the ships,
but need not actually put them in the game.
7.41 Level 3 carrier forces progress to level 4 using the
Level 3 to Level 4 Carrier Forces Table (card 3, front).
Cross-reference the current Level 3 chit with a die roll
(there is a modifi er only when playing Scenario 9). The
result specifi es the number of carriers of each type (CV
and CVL).
7.42 There are no ‘level 4 chits’; instead, you draw
ships. Draw the required ships randomly from the
Japanese ship counters. Note, it will be convenient to
separate the counters into piles by type, so as to be
able to draw the correct numbers of each type. The
Japanese ships will be placed on a Butai display (9.1)
for the new force.
• If there are not enough ships of one type available
you may substitute with the other type (CVL for CV
and vice versa).
• If the force had suffered hits (which would have
been from submarine attack), you assign these
randomly to a carrier at this point. See 14.162.
7.43 When using historical ships (2.35), it can happen
that you exhaust all the historical carriers but the game
calls for more to be brought into play. In this case,
draw from the additional ships. If you bring into play all
historical and additional ships, no more carriers can be
brought into play; do not use the ghost ships (Akagi,
Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu) except in Scenario 9.
7.44 In addition to determining the carriers, you also
determine the surface forces in the screen, as follows:
1. Determine the number of carriers fi rst.
2. Locate the corresponding row in the Screen
Generation Chart (card 3, front). This row specifi es
a type of Level 2 surface force (small, medium, or
large) and a die-roll modifi er.
3. Use the Level 2 to Level 3 Surface Forces Table
(card 3, front) to generate the screen. Use the
column corresponding to the type of Level 2 force
listed in step (2), and apply the die-roll modifi er.
4. The result will be either a Cruiser or Destroyer force
and possibly some battleships. Place these ships
together with the carriers on the Butai display.
• If there are not enough ships of one type available
you may substitute with the other type (CVL for CV
and vice versa).
• If the force had suffered hits (which would have
been from submarine attack), you assign these
randomly to a carrier at this point. See 14.162.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA25
EXAMPLE: A Level 3 CV+CVL (“1 CV 1 CVL”) force is
promoted to Level 4. Using the “1CV 1CVL” column
of the Level 3 to Level 4 Carrier Forces Table, you
roll a 9 and determine that in fact the force consists
of one CV plus two CVLs. Drawing one ship from a
pile that includes all the available Japanese CVs, you
draw Shinano. Drawing two ships from a pile that
includes all the available Japanese CVLs, you draw
Junyo and Ise. These ships are placed on a Butai
display.

---

CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 26
Continuing with the previous EXAMPLE: There are a total of three carriers, so the Screen Generation
Chart specifi es that the screen is to be generated as a Medium Surface force with +1 die roll modifi er.
You roll a 9, which becomes 10 with the modifi er. On the Level 2 to Level 3 Surface Forces Table, a die
roll of 10 in the Medium Surface column gives a result “BB + CA.” You draw the battleship Yamato and
a cruiser force.

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CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA27
7.5 DOUBLE FORCES (OPTIONAL)
DESIGN NOTE: The standard Japanese arrival
mechanism will tend to produce several Japanese
forces at different points of the compass, each with
several carriers. This was an approach the Japanese
had used in several previous battles, and it was of
particular concern to Admiral Spruance. However,
the actual Japanese deployment concentrated all the
Japanese carriers within the space of a single hex. This
optional but recommended rule allows the game to
recreate this deployment. We recommend its use once
you are comfortable with the basic rules for forces and
intelligence.
7.51 When using this rule, make the following changes
to the Level 1 Detection cup:
• Add the Level 1 force chits labelled “Double Force”
to the cup.
• Remove from the Level 1 chit cup the following:
Two L1 Carrier chits, one L1 Large chit, one L1
Surface chit, and two False Contact chits.
Set the Carrier force chits and the Large force chit aside
for use during play (7.52).
7.52 When the fi rst Double Force chit is selected,
proceed as follows:
1. Take one additional Japanese force from among
those not in play and place it in the same hex as
the original force.
2. From the two Carrier and one Large force chits
held out in 7.51, draw two. Place one of these with
each component force.
3. Leave the Double Force chit on top of the stack as
a reminder.
7.53 The two halves of the double force move together
for the rest of the game. You put both activation chits
into the cup, moving the force when the fi rst of the two
is drawn, and ignoring the second.
7.54 The two component forces function in every other
way as separate forces: they are searched and detected
separately, they launch air raids separately (do not
combine), and they must be attacked separately.
• Whenever either component of a double force
is attacked, a “W0” result will result in the strike
making a wrong-target contact against the other.
7.55 When the Commitment rules (13.0) are in use, a
Double Force can enter play only if the Commitment
Index does not already exceed the Commitment Limit
(13.2). If it does, treat the Double Force result as False
Contact.
7.56 It is possible for a second Double Force to enter
play. In this case, use the remaining chit from the three
withheld at start (7.52), and also take one additional
Level 1 Carrier chit from the cup. The limit is two;
additional double force results are ignored.
8.0 DETECTION AND SEARCH
DESIGN NOTE: Force counters represent vague,
imprecise information about a possible force. Detection
represents more precise information — enough to
launch an attack. This information degrades over
time; the ocean is a big place. Since in all eras the fi rst
principle of naval combat has been to attack effectively
fi rst (see the Hughes book in the bibliography),
detection and search are central to the game.
8.1 DETECTION
8.11 Each Japanese force is in one of the following
detection statuses at all times: Undetected [no marker],
Approximate Sighting [‘?’], “Located” [‘L’], or Spotted
[‘S’]’. All states other than Undetected are collectively
called “detected.” Japanese forces enter the game
Undetected.
8.111 “Located” and “Spotted” are equivalent for
most purposes; the only difference is how recent
the information is. Spotted is most recent. Your
information about a force will gradually degrade from
Spotted all the way to Undetected unless you maintain
contact.
8.12 Any force becomes detected in these ways:
• An ‘S’, ‘L’, or ‘?’ result in air search (8.3) or
submarine contact (14.1)
• At the instant a US air strike contacts a Japanese
force (5.2), that force becomes Spotted (S).
• A force that engages in surface combat (21.0)
becomes Spotted (S).
8.13 At the moment a force becomes detected (in any
of the three ways listed in 8.12), the following occur.
• If the force is Spotted or Located, it receives a “S” or
“L”marker respectively.
• If a “?” (Approximate Sighting) is obtained, place an
“?” marker on the force unless it already has an L or
S marker.

• For any detection result (L, S, or ?), if the force is
Level 0, draw a Level 1 chit (7.36). If the result is
False Contact then the force is removed, otherwise it
is now a detected Level 1 force.

---

DESIGN NOTE: The ‘L’ and ‘?’ results in search
represent a sighting where precise information was not
provided. This could occur for many reasons, including
calculation error, coding problems, and garbled or
delayed radio transmission.
8.14 Reducing Detection Status: Whenever a detected
Japanese force is activated, its detection status is
immediately reduced to a lower level, as follows:
• A Spotted (“S”) marker is replaced by Located (“L”)
• A Located marker is replaced by Approximate
Sighting(“?”)
• An Approximate Sighting marker is removed, and
the force is now undetected.
8.15 Detection has the following effects:
• An undetected force cannot be contacted by (and
hence not attacked by) an air strike. In fact, a strike
cannot even fl y out in the direction of that force;
see 4.22-4.23.
• A higher detection status improves the chance of
US air strike contact (5.2).
8.2 AIR SEARCH MISSIONS
DESIGN NOTE: This game shows more detail
about search than its predecessor did, because the
disappointing results of American air search in this
battle were a key factor in the outcome. The US
admirals allocated a very small number of planes -- no
more than a few dozen out of about 950 available in
the fl eet -- to search duties. The result was that the
US got its fi rst chance to launch a strike only late in
the afternoon of the second day of the battle, and was
able to launch only a single deckload, not enough to
achieve the hoped-for results. You have a choice in the
game between a narrow search -- essentially a pencil-
thin beam in a specifi c direction, to a long range -- and
the standard search, which covers a 60-degree arc of
ocean. (The planes would split up this arc and each
cover a small arc of about 5 degrees.) Both types were
used in the actual battle. For more options relating to
search, see advanced rule 18.0.
8.21 The US player may send units on air search. Units
performing air search are placed directly on the map.
They fl y out to a designated distance from the fl eet
and attempt to detect Japanese forces as they go. Air
search is not an “air mission” in the sense of 4.0; the
units do not use the Air Mission Tracks or track fuel.
8.211 Any type of aircraft may conduct search, but
fi ghters (F6F) suffer an adverse die roll modifi er for
search attempts.
8.22 In any one Action Phase per turn, the US player
may declare a Search Segment. If declared, the Search
Segment occurs following the US Air Movement
Segment, as shown on the Game Turn Flow Chart. At
this time the player can launch new searches (8.27),
move search missions (8.271) and resolve search
attempts (8.3). The Search Segment marker can be
placed on the Action Phase track as a reminder that the
search segment option has been used for the current
turn.
8.23 Each search mission is either Standard search or
Narrow search. The player decides which type when
initiating the mission. A Standard search goes out to
ten hexes and a Narrow search to 14. In both cases the
searching units fl y directly out to the marker and back.
however, a Standard search will include everything
within 30 degrees on either side (8.25-8.251), while a
Narrow search includes only the hexes actually fl own
through (8.26).
8.24 For each search mission, a numbered Max
Radius marker is placed in the furthest hex that will be
searched. It has two sides, one for standard search
and one for Narrow search. The search mission fl ies
to the Max Radius marker and back, resolving search
attempts on both the outbound and return legs. After
the search has started its return trip the Max Radius
marker can be removed.
8.25 For a Standard search, the Max Radius marker
is placed in one of the twelve possible hexes marked
with solid squares on the Standard Search Display
(charts card 1, back). Thus, planes fl ying a standard
search always fl y in one of twelve possible directions
(0 degrees, 30 degrees, 60 degrees, 90 degrees, and so
on) from the task group.
8.251 Planes fl ying a standard search can search in
the two narrow wedge-shaped sectors on either side
of their fl ight path. Each of these sectors is 30 degrees
wide (one-twelfth of a circle, or one-third of a right
angle), so the total search sector is 60 degrees wide
(one-sixth of a circle).
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 28

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8.26 For a Narrow search, the Max Radius marker can
be placed in any hex exactly 14 hexes distant from the
point of origin, in any direction. The marker is placed
with its “Narrow” side up.
• The search aircraft must fl y directly to this marker
and back. Only forces in the hexes actually fl own
through are searched.
• A +1 die-roll modifi er applies to all Narrow Search
attempts.
8.261 If the 10-hex or 14-hex distance runs off the edge
of the map, the Max Radius marker can be placed in
the last available hex or half-hex. The search will turn
around at this point.
8.27 To initiate a search, proceed as follows:
1. Launch the unit(s) during a Search Segment.
A search will consist of either one or two units
(stacked together). There is no benefi t to having
more than two.
2. Select a numbered Max Radius marker and place
it as described in 8.25-8.26, on the correct side to
indicate the type of search.
3. Move the search mission two hexes directly
toward the Max Radius.
4. The units may now attempt to search any
Japanese forces located in their Search Zone for
that move (8.3).
EXAMPLE: If the Max Radius marker is placed
at “Max Radius 4” in the illustration, the search
zone will cover both of sectors A and B. If the
marker is placed at “Max Radius 3”, the search
zone will consist of sectors B and C.
8.271 Search aircraft move two hexes in the Search
Segment in which they are launched, and four hexes
in each other Search Segment. Thus, searching aircraft
will end their moves at a distance of two, six, ten, and
(if Narrow searching) 14 hexes away, in successive
Search Segments. Searching aircraft move on a
straight path to their Max Radius marker and back; in
case of doubt or ambiguity, the player may choose.
8.28 Search units return directly to the task group or
task force that launched them, even if it has moved in
the meantime. This implies that search units possibly
will not return on the same path they used outbound.
When search aircraft return to their task group’s hex,
they must immediately land. Landing search aircraft
count against the carrier’s Landing limit for that action
phase, and must observe fl ight deck occupancy limits.
• Search aircraft can land on any carrier in the hex, in
any task group.
• Any units which cannot land are removed from
play. For victory point purposes they are
considered to have ditched in the task group’s
hex.
• The same carrier cannot both launch and land
search aircraft in the same segment.
8.281 If the task group moves, the original hex where
the search was launched is still taken to be the point
of origin for purposes of calculating search zones and
distances. A Search Origin marker may be placed to
mark the hex. Note that the Search Origin marker has
nothing to do with return of searching aircraft (8.28); it
is used only to compute search zones and distances.
8.282 Aircraft launched or landed in the Search
Segment count against the limit that each carrier
can launch or land in the immediately following US
Air Operations Segment. A carrier which launches a
search mission is considered to have launched
aircraft and therefore cannot land any aircraft
in that same Action Phase; likewise, landing a
search mission prevents the carrier from doing any
launches.
8.3 AIR SEARCH RESOLUTION
8.31 After its movement in each Search Segment, a
search mission can attempt search against certain
enemy forces (8.32-8.33). Note that aircraft can search
on both the outbound and return legs of their mission.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA29

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CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 30
8.32 For a Narrow search, a force is searched only if
the searched aircraft fl ew into or through the same hex
in that move. The player can choose the exact path as
long as it proceeds straight and direct from the origin
point to the max radius hex (and on the return leg,
from the max radius hex to the current position of the
launching task group / task force). Note that when the
search path runs along a hexside, the player chooses
which of the two adjacent hexes the air unit will move
through.
8.33 For a Standard search, the Standard Search
display defi nes three zones according to range. The
close zone is 0-2 hexes from the task group, the
middle zone is 3-6 hexes, and the far zone is 7-10
hexes. Aircraft search forces in the zone they just fl ew
through. The example below shows the zones. Note
that the search zone is always computed with respect
to the point of origin (8.281), but on the return leg, the
searchers’ path back to their launching task group / task
force will determine what zones they fl y through.
8.331 Search is resolved against every enemy force in
the zone at that moment, in any order. Each air search
resolves its search attempts separately -- thus, an
enemy force could be searched more than once per
turn.
• Enemy forces which might have started the
game turn in the zone, but have been activated
and moved out before the search segment was
declared, are not searched.
8.332 If the maximum Search Zone extends off the
map edge, then the air unit turns around in the last
zone it can search. It will spend two turns in that zone
(one outbound, one inbound) before returning to the
previous zone. Note, if only part of the maximum
range Search Zone is off map, then the search
proceeds normally, and the air unit searches whatever
part of the zone is on the map.
EXAMPLE: In the following image, the searching
SB2C has just moved four hexes from hex X to its
current position, on its way towards its destination
at “Max Radius 4.” The search zone for this turn is
the orange area. Force F will be searched. Force G
and Force I will not be.
Force J started the game turn in hex Y and moved
one hex eastwards to its present location; the
search will miss it, since it is no longer in the zone
being searched.
8.34 A search attempt is resolved using the Air Search
Table (card 1, back). Roll one die, apply all modifi ers,
and read the result from the table. Results are listed
beside the table.
• There is a die-roll benefi t if two units are searching.
Note that this means two units in the same search
mission; each search mission resolves its attempts
separately. There is no additional benefi t for more than
two units in a mission.
• A narrow search receives a +1 benefi t,
• If a US submarine unit is currently shadowing
the force (14.15), there is a die roll benefi t.
There is no additional benefi t for more than one
submarine.
• There are also modifi ers for time of day, range, or
fi ghters searching.
a. The fi ghters modifi er applies if any of the units
being rolled for are fi ghters.
b. Range is the distance from the search launch
point.
c. Only night-capable aircraft (optional rule 22.0)
can make search attempts on night turns.

---

DESIGN NOTE: Search was chancy at the best of
times: pilots might fail to spot enemy ships, fail to
recognize them, or suffer a radio malfunction and be
unable to communicate their fi ndings. Modifi ers for
range occur because as the search fans out to longer
ranges, each plane is covering a larger area of ocean.
The time of day modifi er refl ects that it became much
harder to see targets as dusk gathered. Fighters get
an adverse modifi er because the pilot of a single-seat,
single-engine plane could not give his full attention to
observing the ocean -- in fact all his training told him to
ignore the surface and scan the sky for enemy planes
.
8.341 If you obtain a ‘S’, ‘L’, or ‘?’ result:
1. If the force is Level 0, draw a Level 1 chit from the
cup. If the result is False Contact, remove the force
from the map and discard the False Contact chit
-- it is not replaced in the cup. (The Force marker
becomes Available again for arrival on later turns.)
Otherwise, place the chit underneath the (now
Level 1) force. If the force is Level 1 Carrier, then
in scenario 6 and after you will need to adjust the
Commitment Index (13.0).
2. Place the marker for the new detection level (8.13).
8.342 If you obtain a ‘chit+1’ result against a Level 1 or
higher force:
1. Use the Intelligence Tables (7.3) to promote the
force to the next higher intelligence level.
2. If this causes a non-carrier force to become a
carrier force, US Advantage results (8.35). Also in
this event, in scenario 6 and after you will need to
adjust the Commitment Index (13.0).
Note that these effects apply only if the force was
already Level 1 when searched. Against a Level 0
force, the “chit+1” part of a result is ignored.
8.35 US Advantage: You place a “US Advantage”
marker whenever a non-carrier force (either Surface, or
type not specifi ed) becomes a carrier force as a result
of a “chit+1” result in search. The marker remains
in place until the Japanese force completes its next
activation.
8.351 The effects of a US Advantage marker are:
• a DRM on the Japanese Air Raid Table, making it
less likely that the force will attack you, and
• A die-roll modifi er in Surprise, making surprise
more likely.
DESIGN NOTE: The US Advantage rule represents
the chance that you may have surprised the Japanese.
If the force had already found you, it probably would
have generated an air raid and become a carrier force
at that point.

9.0 JAPANESE CARRIER FORCES
A Japanese carrier force is one with any type of
“carrier” or “carriers” Intelligence Chit, or a Level 4
force containing carrier units. As soon as a carrier force
is known to have air units, you keep track of what you
know about the force using a special play aid, the Butai
Display.
9.1 BUTAI DISPLAY
DESIGN NOTE: The Japanese word “butai,” which
means in this context “force,’’ “echelon,” or “element,”
was often used to refer to combat groupings of
Japanese ships, much like the US terms “task force”
and “task group.” The Butai display replaces the paper
record-keeping and some of the on-map markers of the
original Carrier game.
9.11 When a Japanese force either reaches Level 2 with
carriers, or is Level 1 but has air points, you need to set
up a Butai display for it. Proceed as follows:
1. Select one Butai display to represent information
about that force. The Butai displays are printed on
separate cards. This card can be placed anywhere
convenient near the map. When you are playing
action from June 19 the Butai displays can be
placed over top of the westernmost portion of the
hex fi eld, as that space is not needed until June 20.
2. For each Butai display there is a Butai counter,
identifi ed for convenience by number. Replace
the force counter on the map with the Butai
counter.
3. Remove the original force’s activation chit from the
cup, and replace it with the activation chit for the
Butai.
4. The Intelligence Chit may be placed in the
corresponding space on the display.
5. The Butai counter functions the same as other
forces, but it allows the carrier force to be linked
to the Butai display. From that point on, the Butai
display is used to keep track of known information
about the force’s air assets and ships.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA31

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CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 32
display is used to keep track of known information
about the force’s air assets and ships.
NOTE: You do not yet set up a Butai display for a
Level 1 “carrier” force that does not yet have air points
because there is still a chance that this “carrier” force
might turn out to have no carriers after all.
9.12 The Butai display has the following sections:
• The Intel Level space holds the force’s intelligence
chit.
• The Air Raid boxes hold air points for air aids
currently in progress (10.0, step G).
• The Air Raid Return Track is used to keep track of
air raids returning to the force (10.3). An air raid
counter is placed initially in a box of the track
corresponding to their return distance (i.e., the
distance from force to target) and then moved
one one box to the right each time the force is
activated.
• The Turnaround Track is used to measure the
time it takes to service aircraft and make them
available again. When a Japanese raid counter
reaches the last box of the Air Raid Return Track, it
is considered to have landed. The air raid counter
(and its corresponding marker on the Butai display)
is removed, and the air points in the raid are
placed in the fi rst (leftmost) box of the Turnaround
Track, indicating that they are being made ready
to attack again. They are then moved one box
at a time along this track each time the force is
activated. The fi rst two boxes of the Turnaround
track are labelled ‘Servicing.’ Air points in these
boxes are being refueled and rearmed and are
not available for any strikes. The remaining boxes
are labelled “Available 0-3,” “Available 0-7,” and
“Available 0-11.” Units in these boxes are available
for raids at the stated ranges, only.
• The “Available All Ranges” box is also the last
box of the Turnaround track. Units in this box are
available for strikes at all ranges (at least, all ranges
within those allowed by the air raid procedure).
• The Lost box contains units that have been
eliminated in combat (or diverted to Guam,
advanced rule 23.0).
• The Ships section is used only for Level 4 forces, to
hold the ships of the force.
EXAMPLE: A Japanese raid completes its attacks.
The target is eight hexes from the launching force, so
the air raid counter is placed in the “8-11” box of the
return track. In the next Air Movement Step, it will be
moved to the “4-7,” box and in the phase after that
to the “0-3” box. In the phase after that, the air raid
counter and its corresponding marker are removed,
and the air units are placed in the fi rst “Servicing”
box of the Turnaround Track. In the next phase, they
are moved to the second “Servicing” box, and then in
the next phase, to “Available 0-3.” During that same
Action Phase, their force is activated and launches a
strike against a target fi ve hexes away. These points
are counted Unavailable for that strike, since they are
available only at 0-3 hexes at this time.
9.13 If a Level 4 carrier force loses all its aircraft
carriers, the remaining units are treated as a Level 3
surface force. If a regular Force unit is available, place
this unit on the map in place of the Butai and place
the surface ships under it. The Butai counter is then
returned to the pile of unused units.

---

9.2 AIR POINTS, KNOWN AIR STRENGTH, AND
AIR VALUE
DESIGN NOTE: Air points in Carrier represent not
what the Japanese have, but what you know about
what they have. For Level 1 and Level 2 forces your
information is less complete, and we speak of Known
Air Strength (in the predecessor game, this same basic
concept was called Revealed Air Strength). This is not
necessarily all the aircraft the force has, just the ones
you know about. At Level 3 and Level 4 you have more
defi nite and specifi c information, which is called the Air
Value.
9.21 The air assets of Japanese carrier forces are
represented by air points. Air point units are generic --
unlike US aircraft, they do not represent specifi c types
-- and may be exchanged in any denominations, like
making change.
9.22 Air points are held on the Butai displays (9.1). They
are never placed directly on the map. Air points are
added to a force’s Butai display as it performs air raids
(9.23). Once added to the Butai display, the air points
never leave it; if eliminated in combat they are moved
to the Lost box of the display.
9.23 A Level 1 or 2 force adds air points as it generates
raids (10.1E). This is an important and perhaps diffi cult
concept: the air raid procedure tells you how many
points are in the raid. This may exceed the number
so far revealed. (For the fi rst raid launched by a force,
nothing will yet have been revealed.) You draw as
many points as possible from those already revealed
and known to be available. If more points are needed,
you add them by taking counters from those not in use,
thus adding to the force’s total of known air points.
9.24 Known Air Strength: To compute this total, add all
air points anywhere on the Butai display -- including the
Lost box and all boxes of the Turnaround Track. The
Known Air Strength is an input to both the air raid and
intelligence processes (10.1E, 7.37). Note that a Known
Air Strength of zero is different from an unknown air
strength.
DESIGN NOTE: The Known Air Strength can be
thought of as the minimum number of air points you
know the force must have had at the start of the battle,
including points that have since been shot down. The
force might yet have other air points you don’t know
about. A force that has shown you more aircraft is
more likely to launch large raids, unless lots of those
aircraft were shot down or are still doing turnaround --
and also more likely to have more ships.
9.241 If the force has permanent hits (12.23), you
subtract one per hit from the force’s Known Air
Strength when computing the strength for air raid
purposes (only). You do not apply this modifi er when
computing the strength for purposes of the Intelligence
Tables.
EXAMPLE: A Level 2 force (Butai) has four air
points in its “Available All Ranges” box, two
air points in its “0-3 Available” box, and two air
points in its Lost Box; total Known Air Strength,
8. You determine that it launches an air raid of
six air points at a range of 10 hexes. You would
take the fi rst four points from those available
at all ranges. The points in the 0-3 box cannot
be used for this raid, and neither can the lost
points, so you would take 2 more air point
counters from those not in use and add them to
the raid. These represent planes that were there
all along but which you didn’t yet know about.
Thus, the force would now have a Known Air
Strength of 10. If the raid had been launched at
a range of two hexes you could have used the
points in the 0-3 box and you would not have
needed to add any. In that case the Known Air
Strength would have remained at 8.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA33

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9.25 Air Value (Level 3 forces): When a force attains
Level 3, it receives a Level 3 intelligence chit, which has
a printed Air Value.
• For raids (10.1), the printed air value is used to
compute an initial raid strength (10.1E), which is
then modifi ed for lost/unavailable points (10.1F).
The number of points lost or unavailable are shown
on the Butai display.
• For CAP (5.4), you use a net air value, which is the
base air value minus the number lost or unavailable.
DESIGN NOTE: The difference between Air Value
and Known Air Strength is that the former defi nes
the maximum the force could have, while the latter
represents only what you know about so far. In other
words, Air Value provides an upper bound while
Known Air Strength is only a lower bound. This
represents the more complete and defi nite information
you have about Level 3 and Level 4 forces.
9.26 Air Value (Level 4 forces): Level 4 forces work like
level 3, with the difference that when a force attains
Level 4, you draw its actual carrier counters and
place them in the Ships box of the Butai display (7.4).
From that point on, the force’s air value is the sum of
the printed air values of its carriers, adjusted for any
permanent hits (12.23).
10.0 JAPANESE AIR RAIDS
The Japanese air raid procedure determines whether you detect an incoming air raid from an activated Japanese force. This includes a determination of whether this is actually a carrier force (if you do not already know), whether it launches an attack against you, and in what strength.
DESIGN NOTE: In Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea, every
Japanese force is potentially a carrier force until you
are sure that it is not. And any force that may contain
carriers may launch air raids. It’s critical to understand
that you fi nd out about an air raid when you detect it
-- not when it was launched, which would have been
some time before. The strength of the raid may be
affected by things that have happened in the past,
such as hits on the launching force. The information
the game gives you over time is consistent, albeit
often vague and uncertain. For example, a force
that launches a large air raid is more likely to end up
containing a large number of carriers.
10.1 AIR RAID PROCEDURE
The air raid procedure -- including modifi ers applied
for known information about Japanese air strength -- is
one of the most important parts of the game, and also
the most complex. (Scenario 5 lets you practice it in a
simplifi ed situation.)
The air raid procedure is carried out at the instant any
Japanese force is activated, before that force moves.
The Air Raid Flow Chart can be used as a reference for
the steps. It is recommended to follow along on this
play aid when reading the instructions that follow. In
Scenario 5, omit the steps noted as “Scenario 6 and
after.”
You can think of the air raid procedure as a sequence
of four questions:
1. “If this were a carrier force, would it attack me
now?” (Steps A and B)
2. “If so, is this actually a carrier force?” (Step C)
3. “If so, and if it had full air strength, how big would
the raid be?” (Steps D and E)
4. “If the force is not at full strength, by how much
should the raid be reduced?” (Step F)
A. Is this force potentially eligible to launch a raid?
1. A force which already has two raids in progress
cannot launch a raid. For purposes of this rule,
all units on return tracks (not yet reached their
Servicing boxes) are counted as a single “raid.”
2. Otherwise, a force is potentially eligible to launch a
raid if either:
• It is a carrier force; or
• It is a Level 0 force or Level 1 small/med/large
force, and the Japanese carrier commitment limit
has not yet been exceeded. (Scenario 5 does not
use commitment limits.) A Surface force is never
eligible to launch a raid.
DESIGN NOTE: The idea is that as long as the carrier
commitment limit has not been exceeded, there can
still be more undiscovered carriers out there, so any
one of the force types listed could be a carrier force.
In a later step of the procedure, you will determine
whether it really is.
B. Does the force discover a target within range?
This step uses the Japanese Air Raid Generation Table
(card 2, back) to determine if the Japanese carriers (if
there are any) fi nd and wish to attack a target in range.
1. First check the maximum range allowed on the
current game turn, as listed on the table. If there is
no US task group within that range, there is no raid.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 34

---

2. Next, select the target task group. This will be the
closest US task group with carriers. If there is more
than one equally close, select the one with the most
carriers.
3. Then roll the die and apply modifi ers listed on the
table (some of which depend on the game turn and
one of which is specifi c to scenario 9, only) and read
a result. The result will either be that the Japanese
launch an attack, or not.
DESIGN NOTE: The table refl ects the chance of the
Japanese fi nding you, and takes into account the
time of day and the time required to reach targets.
It presumes that strikes might be launched in the
predawn darkness (astronomical twilight) as was done
at Pearl Harbor, provided targets have been found,
but not earlier. Individual search planes with highly
experienced pilots could be launched in full night, but
strikes could not (at least, not in 1944)
.
C. Is this in fact a carrier force?
If the Japanese force is already known to be a carrier
force, skip to step D. Otherwise, it must be either a
Level 0 force, or a Level 1 Large, Medium, or Small
force.
1. If it is a Level 0 force, fi rst draw a Level 1
Intelligence chit.
a. If this is a Carrier force chit, continue to step D
(you now have a Level 1 carrier force).
b. If it is a Small, Medium, or Large force, continue
to step C(2). (This will occur only in Scenario 6
and after.)
c. If it is any type of Surface chit, or a False
Contact, replace the Level 1 chit in the cup; the
force reverts to Level 0 and does not launch a
strike. Note that you do not remove the force
in the event of False Contact; the air raid is
cancelled, but the force remains in play and
could turn out to have carriers later.
2. (Scenario 6 and after) If the force is Level 1 Large,
Medium, or Small, use the Level 1 to Level 2
Intelligence Table (card 3, front) to determine a
Level 2 force chit.
a. If this turns out to be a Carrier force, proceed to
step D (you now have a Level 2 carrier force).
b. If this turns out to be any type of Surface force,
remove the Level 2 chit and revert the force
to whatever level it was at the start of this
procedure. If you just promoted it from Level 0
to Level 1 in step C(1), it reverts back to Level
0 now, and the Level 1 chit used is replaced in
the cup. The force does not launch a raid at this
time.
3. (Scenario 6 and after) If the force is a Level 1
carrier force with a known air strength (i.e., it has
previously launched raids), promote it to Level 2
using the Level 1 to Level 2 Intelligence Table. The
force then uses the procedure for Level 2 forces.
(That procedure will correctly take into account the
force’s known air strength.)
DESIGN NOTE: The idea is that you get information
at this time only if the force decides to launch a raid
against you. The information you get is what you can
infer from the raid. You aren’t seeing the actual ships.
So, if the above procedure winds up with a non-carrier
force, and hence no raid, you ‘call back the play’ (as in
American football) and discard the changes, since you
didn’t see anything. The force might turn out later to
be a carrier force after all. Note that Level 1 chits that
result in non-carrier forces during the air raid procedure
are replaced in the cup and the force remains in play.
This is in contrast to what happens during search,
when the chits are removed from the cup and the force
is removed from play.
D. (Scenario 6 and after) Compute Known Air
Strength or Air Value. (In Scenario 5 the air strength
is specifi ed by scenario rules.)
• Level 1-2 forces have a Known Air Strength, which
is the sum of all air points on the Butai Display,
including Lost or Unavailable points (9.24). If there
are no air points on the display, the strength is
‘unknown.’
• Level 3 forces have an Air Value which is printed
on the Intelligence Chit. Air points on the Butai
Display do not affect this value.
• Level 4 forces have an Air Value which is the sum
of all the individual aircraft carrier values in the
force, adjusted for damage (12.23). Damage to the
carrier affects this value, but air points on the Butai
Display do not.
Note: In all cases, the known air strength or air value
represents what the Japanese force would have been
capable of if it could muster all its aircraft. Adjustments
for lost or otherwise unavailable aircraft are made in
Step F.
E. Determine strength of raid.
There are three Air Raid Strength tables:
• Level 1-2 Forces, Known Air Strength (card
2, back). (This is the only table you will use in
Scenario 5.) On this table, you select the column
corresponding to the known air strength (9.24),
apply column shifts (listed with the table) for the
force type (e.g., “1-2 Carrier”), then
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA35

this value but air points on the Butai Display do not Note In all cases the known air strength or air value represents what the Japanese force would have been capable of if it could muster all its aircraft Adjustments for lost or otherwise unavailable aircraft are made in Step F E Determine strength of raid There are three Air Raid Strength tables Level 1 2 Forces Known Air Strength card 2 back This is the only table you will use in Scenario 5 On this table you select the column corresponding to the known air strength 9 24 apply column shifts listed with the table for the force type e g 1 2 Carrier then CARRIER BATTLE PHILIPPINE SEA35

---

cross-reference with a die roll. (Note: you cannot
have a Level 1 force with a known air strength
launching a raid; it would have been promoted to
Level 2 in step C(3).)
• Level 1-2 Forces, Unknown Air Strength (card 2,
back). On this table, you cross-reference the force
type (“Level 1 Carrier,” etc.) with a die-roll. (This
table is used only in the full-battle scenarios --
Scenario 6 and after.)
• Level 3-4 Forces, and Guam (card 3, back): On
this table you select the column corresponding
to air value (9.25-9.26), then cross-reference with
a die roll. (This table is used only in the full-battle
scenarios -- Scenario 6 and after.)
Note that in the air value or known air strength may
be modifi ed for hits the force has suffered (9.24-9.26).
(You do not need to worry about this in Scenario 5.)
The result is the number of air points in the attack.
• A result with the ‘/’ symbol indicates an attack in
two waves. For example, “5/4” indicates a fi rst
wave of fi ve point and a second wave of four
points. The second wave becomes a second,
separate air raid, placed separately on the map
(10.24). However, in the full battle scenarios
(Scenario 6 and after) this strength must be
adjusted for lost or unavailable air points (Step F)
and this may result in a reduction from two waves
to one. Also, if a force already has one raid in
play, an additional raid always is delivered as one
wave, with the combined strength of both values
(9 in the example above).
• Air raids from Guam (land-based aircraft) always
arrive in a single wave. Add the two wave values
together and use the combined value, after
applying Step F. (Guam air raids occur only in
Scenario 6 and after.)
DESIGN NOTE: You will see that the Level 1-2 and
Level 3-4 tables are similar, but the Level 1-2 allows a
greater range of values, and hence more uncertainty.
This is in keeping with the basic concept that you have
less defi nite information about Level 1 and 2 forces.
The table for Level 1 and 2 forces with no known air
strength allows the greatest uncertainty of all.
F. (Scenario 6 and after) Reduce raid strength for
points lost or unavailable.
1. Total the number of air points in the Lost box of
the force’s Butai Display, plus the total in Servicing
boxes, plus the number in the Butai’s air raid
boxes, plus the number unavailable at this range.
a. The number unavailable at this range is the total
in Available boxes that are lower numbered
than the range. For example, if the target is
at a range of 9 hexes, then any points in the
“Available 0-3” and “Available 0-6” hexes are
counted as unavailable.
b. For raids from Guam the same procedure is
used, but you are applying to the Guam Display
instead of a Butai Display.
2. Using the Air Raid Strength Reduction Chart, cross-
reference the initial strength for the raid obtained
in (E) with the number of points lost/unavailable.
(No die-roll is involved.) The result is the reduced,
fi nal strength of the attack.
3. For raids with two waves, add the value of both to
get the initial strength. Apply any reduction to the
second wave. If the strength of that wave falls to
three or less, the two waves are combined into one
(i.e., what remains of the second wave is added
back into the fi rst).
G. Place air point counters in Air Raid box.
Select an available Air Raid box on the Butai display
for this force, and place air points in the box. For raids
with two waves, you use both boxes. (Remember that
if there was already a raid in play for this force, the two
waves are combined into one.)
10.11 There are no separate Japanese fi ghter and
attack plane counters; there are just generic “naval
air” and “land air” counters in point denominations,
like change. Each Air Raid box has a ‘fi ghters’ section
and a ‘attack planes’ section. These will hold air points
known to be of those types.
10.12 When a raid is fi rst launched, you do not know
how many of its points are fi ghters and how many are
attack planes. Simply put counters representing the
total strength of the raid on the boundary line between
the Fighter and Attack Plane boxes.
10.13 You determine the exact number of attack planes
and fi ghters when the raid is fi rst contacted by US
fi ghters, or if never contacted by fi ghters, then when it
reaches its target, as follows:
1. On the Japanese Escort Fighter Table (card 2,
front), locate the highest column not exceeding
the size of the raid (e.g., if the raid has seven
points, then use the “6” column.
2. Roll one die and cross reference with the strike
size to determine the number of fi ghter points.
3. From the total points in the raid, put the required
number in the Fighters box. These now represent
fi ghters for the duration of the raid.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 36

the exact number of attack planes and fi ghters when the raid is fi rst contacted by US fi ghters or if never contacted by fi ghters then when it reaches its target as follows 1 On the Japanese Escort Fighter Table card 2 front locate the highest column not exceeding the size of the raid e g if the raid has seven points then use the 6 column 2 Roll one die and cross reference with the strike size to determine the number of fi ghter points 3 From the total points in the raid put the required number in the Fighters box These now represent fi ghters for the duration of the raid CARRIER BATTLE PHILIPPINE SEA 36

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4. Put the remainder in the Attack Planes box -- i.e.,
all points which are not fi ghters are attack planes.
These represent attack planes for the duration of
the raid.
10.14 The grouping into fi ghters and attack planes --
and the identifi cation of individual air points as each of
those types -- endures only for the duration of the raid.
The aircraft revert to being generic ‘air points’ upon
return to their carrier.
DESIGN NOTE: You will note that the same force might
launch one strike having one proportion of fi ghters,
and then later launch a strike with a different mix.
Remember that the air points only refl ect what you
know so far. You don’t know what else the Japanese
might have on their decks.
EXAMPLE: Japanese Force ‘H,’ currently at Level
0, is located eight hexes away from TF 58 when
activated. It is the 0810 turn. According to the
Japanese Air Raid Generation Table the maximum
range for a strike on the 0810 turn is 11 hexes, so
a strike is possible. The table lists a modifi er of -1
for raids on this turn. It also lists a 0 modifi er for
range 7-9. The net modifi er is -1. Your die roll is a
“6”, modifi ed to 5, and thus the force would launch
an attack if possible. You draw a Level 1 chit and
it turns out to be “Level 1 Carrier.” This is the fi rst
carrier force that has appeared, so you use Butai
display 1 for it, placing the Intelligence chit in the
upper corner and replacing the Force “A” counter
with “Butai 1.” The force has no air points yet, so
you use the Air Raid Strength Table for Level 1-2
Forces With Unknown Air Strength. A die roll of “7”
on the “L1 Carrier” column yields a result of “8/5”
-- a fi rst wave of 8 points and a second wave of 5
more.

EXAMPLE: In the previous example, suppose
instead that Force “A” was already known to be
Level 1 Carrier, but had not previously launched
a raid, and that it had just been detected by a US
search attempt in which a “US Advantage” marker
was placed. In this case an additional die-roll
modifi er of -3 would have applied, and the force
would not have launched an attack. This is one
effect of US Advantage.
10.2 RAID PLACEMENT AND MOVEMENT
“The particular strength of your [carrier] task force is
the use of radar, interception of radio messages, and
intercepting by radar of Japanese air attacks which they
can catch and destroy (‘eat up’) whenever they want
to.” — Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, postwar interrogation,
October 1945
10.21 After a raid has been generated and its strength,
composition, and target determined, the raid is placed
on the map using this procedure:
1. Roll one die and consult the Intercept Range Table
(card 1, front), applying die-roll modifi ers listed.
The result shows the range of intercept.
2. The raid will be placed at the specifi ed distance
from the target.
a. Count along a direct line from source to target.
Note: The “source” is the force which launched
the strike; the “target” is the target US force as
determined in 10.1(B).
b. In case of ambiguity, prefer a hex containing no
US aircraft.
c. If there is still ambiguity, resolve randomly.
10.22 The Air Raid counter represents the planes in the
raid. Only the raid counter is placed on the map, not
the planes. Once placed, the raid moves as a unitary
whole. Japanese air units never transfer from one raid
to another, nor do raids split up or combine.
10.23 A raid moves two hexes per Japanese Air
Movement segment. US units do not affect this
movement. The raid moves directly to its target task
group along a straight line from source to target. If
there is a choice of two hexes equally along the straight
line, pick randomly.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA37

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10.231 Note that the Japanese Air Movement Segment
precedes the Activation Segment, and therefore new
raids -- which are placed during the Activation Segment
-- do not move in the same Action Phase they are
placed.
10.24 When a force launches a pair of raids as a fi rst
and second wave, the fi rst wave is placed according to
10.21. The second one is placed two hexes behind the
fi rst wave, counting back towards the originating forces
by the most direct path. Both waves are placed on the
map immediately.
DESIGN NOTE: You see the Japanese aircraft only
in the fi nal hexes before they reach their targets; we
presume they move at a speed of 2 hexes per segment
during that time. For the rest of their mission, out of
your sight, they would be using more economical
cruising speeds. It may seem odd that the Japanese
can fl y right through US interceptors, but planes don’t
come to a stop in midair. What is really happening is
a running fi ght as the Japanese fl y toward their target.
The US interceptors generally will move to the hex
where the Japanese ended up and air combat will be
resolved there. The battle actually would be occurring
over the course of one to two hexes of movement.
10.3 AIR RAID RETURN
10.31 After a carrier air raid’s air-to-surface combat
is complete, the raid marker is placed on the Air Raid
Return track for the Butai that launched it (as recorded
by marker). Place it in the box corresponding to the
current distance from the launching force to the target
task group. The raid does not remain on the map to fl y
back to its carriers; the Air Raid Return track represents
the return fl ight. (Raids launched from Guam are
different in this respect; see 11.28.)
10.32 Returning units are moved one box per action
phase along the track to lower numbered boxes, then
to the Turnaround boxes, and then to the Available
boxes, as described in 9.12 and its example. This
occurs at the time the force is activated.
10.33 If the Japanese force has no operating fl ight
decks when the returning aircraft are due to be placed
in the Turnaround box, the air points are eliminated.
11.0 JAPANESE LAND-BASED AIR
Japanese land-based aircraft operating from Guam were a concern for the Americans. Admiral Ozawa was led to believe that he would get powerful support from these forces. They were weaker than he expected and they accomplished nothing. Rule 16.1 may be added to let the land-based air turn out to be stronger than it was historically.
11.1 LAND AIR BASES AND UNITS
11.11 Japanese land-based air units are represented
by unit counters. Like naval air, these are represented
in the form of generic unit counters, which can be
exchanged for one another in any denominations.
11.12 The Japanese have an air base at Guam. It can
launch air raids against American forces (it is, in effect,
a large stationary aircraft carrier).
11.13 Japanese air bases at Yap/Peleliu and Iwo Jima
do not launch raids, but can be a source of land air
reinforcements if Rule 16.1 is in play.
11.2 LAND-BASED AIR RAIDS
DESIGN NOTE: Procedures for Japanese land bases
and their aircraft are much simpler than those for
carrier aircraft because there is less uncertainty: you
know exactly where each base is and how large it
is. However, the exact number of aircraft remains a
mystery to you: the Japanese were good at hiding their
aircraft from view, using revetments and the like.
11.21 Guam has an Air Value, assigned by scenario.
Place the Guam Air Value marker on the Records Track
at the start of the game to record the value. The Air
Value of Guam can change only if Rule 16.0 is in play.
(Note, the use of Rule 16.0 is recommended as soon as
you don’t mind adding on a little more complexity; it
adds many possibilities.)
11.22 Guam has its own activation chit. (Note: There
are also activation chits for “Iwo Jima” and “Yap/
Peleliu” but they are used only with Rule 16.0.) When
the Guam activation chit is drawn, and if no Guam air
raid is currently in play, carry out the air raid procedure
in the same manner as for a Level 4 Japanese force.
• Note that the activation chit, as for forces,
determines when you launch raids, not when you
move aircraft. Guam’s aircraft are moved at the
same time as naval aircraft.
11.23 Guam cannot launch a new air raid if a Guam air
raid is currently in play. In this event treat the Guam
activation chit as a No Op.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 38

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11.24 The decision to launch a raid from Guam is made
using the Japanese Air Raid Generation Table (card
2, back), same as for naval air raids. The strength of a
Guam raid is determined using the “Level 3-4 Forces
and Guam” chart (card 3, back). Use the column for
Guam’s current net air value (its original value minus
any points lost or unavailable). The Air Strength
Reduction Chart is not used for Guam. If Guam’s air
value is less than 3, it does not launch a raid.
11.25 Die-roll modifi ers for game turn and range apply
to Guam as for any other Japanese raid. US Advantage
never applies to Guam. There is a special die-roll
modifi er if a US intercept mission is present in the
Guam hex (11.27).
11.26 The Guam raid counter is placed on
the map as follows:
1. If the US player has an intercept mission
in the Guam hex, the raid is always placed in
that same hex (11.27).
2. Otherwise, the raid is placed using the procedure
of 10.2, determining a distance of intercept. If the
distance from Guam to the US task force is less
than the distance of intercept, place the raid in the
Guam hex.
3. A Guam raid always arrives as a single wave. If you
get a two-wave result from the table, you combine
with the values: e.g., a 5/4 result becomes a single
raid of nine points.
11.27 If the US player has an intercept mission in the
Guam hex, there are the following effects:
1. A die-roll modifi er is applied to the air raid
generation die roll when the Guam activation chit
is drawn. This modifi er is listed on the Air Raid
Generation Table (card 2, back).
2. If a raid is launched from Guam, the raid is placed
in the Guam hex and does not move in that Action
Phase. Other segments in the Action Phase are
carried out normally. The US player adds two to
his air-to-air combat die roll against the Guam units
in that phase. This applies only when units are
taking off from Guam, not when they are landing.
The above effects are only for an intercept mission.
An air strike mission does not have these effects. Note
that a US intercept mission can loiter in the Guam hex
(as was done during the actual battle), paying one fuel
point per action phase.
11.28 The Guam display has no raid return sections.
Instead, following a raid the the raid is fl own back to
Guam on the map by the most direct path. It moves in
each segment, just as incoming Japanese air raids do.
A Guam raid may be intercepted en route either to or
from the target. Conduct air-to-air combat as usual and
place any air points lost in the Losses box for Guam.
11.29 When the raid returns to Guam, place the air
points in the Landed section of the Guam display. From
there they move to the Servicing section and then to
the Available (at various ranges) box in the same way
as for the Butai displays.
12.0 DAMAGE, FIRE, AND CRIPPLED
SHIPS
12.1 US CARRIER DAMAGE
All damage to US carriers is recorded using Hit markers. These numbered markers can be used like change.
12.11 The US Damage Effects Summary Chart (card 4,
front) lists the effects of damage for each type of carrier
(CV and CVL).
• A carrier’s damage state is referred to as “light
damage”, “heavy damage”, or “crippled,” as listed
on the chart. These terms are used in certain
other rules and victory conditions.
• Effects include a reduction of the carrier’s AA
value, restrictions on fl ight operations, and a loss
of ability to move. (For damage to surface ships,
see 12.5.)
12.12 Inoperative Flight Decks: A US carrier
that suffers any hits (even light damage)
immediately receives an Inoperative Flight
Deck marker. While it has this marker, it
cannot conduct any air operations. This
includes launching or landing units and raising or
lowering aircraft.
12.13 Repair of Inoperative Flight Decks: At the end
of each Action Phase (not game turn), roll one die for
each Inoperative Flight Deck marker. On a net roll of 7
or higher, the marker is removed. Do not make the roll
in the same phase in which the damage is suffered.
• Note that a carrier can potentially have an
Inoperative Flight Deck and Deck Crash marker
at the same time, and it needs to remove both
before fl ight operations can resume.
DESIGN NOTE: “Inoperative Flight Deck” encompasses
any damage that would shut down air operations.
This might be holes in the deck, debris on the deck,
or damage to the ship’s power plant or steering that
prevented the ship from steaming into the wind
as required for launch and landing. US sailors had
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA39

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become very effi cient at repairing these problems, but
the time required could vary. The differences in this
area between this game and its predecessor refl ect the
much improved state of damage control procedures in
the US Navy by mid-1944.
12.14 In addition to effects listed on the chart, a US
carrier immediately loses one air unit for each hit
suffered. Units must be lost fi rst from the fl ight deck
(landed or ready), next from servicing, and last from
the hangar; select one unit randomly for each hit,
within these categories.
• Each unit lost from the hangar counts as two units
for this purpose.
EXAMPLE: A US carrier suffers three
hits. It has one Landing unit and four
others in the hangar. The Landing
unit is eliminated. One of the units in
the hangar is eliminated. The unit in
the hangar counts double, so this
counts as three total units
eliminated, as required.
12.15 Repair of inoperative fl ight decks (12.13) and
clearing of deck crashes are the only forms of “repair”
in the game.
12.16 A US CV with 6 or 7 hits or a CVL with 4 hits is
Crippled. See 12.4.
12.2 JAPANESE CARRIER DAMAGE
DESIGN NOTE: The basic idea is that damage to
a Japanese carrier will affect the force’s ability to
launch planes, but will not affect raids already in the
air. Since raids were launched some time before
you detect them, it is necessary to take into account
whether damage happened before a particular raid was
launched, or after.
12.21 For Japanese carriers there are three types of
hits: current turn, previous turn, and permanent. Only
permanent hits affect air raid strength.
1. When hits are initially suffered, place a “Hit --
Current Turn” marker in the correct number of
hits.
2. In the Update Hit Markers step of the End Phase,
do the following:
a. Replace each “Hit -- Previous Turn” marker with
a permanent Hits marker.
b. Flip each “Hit -- Current Turn” marker to its “Hit
-- Previous Turn” side.
12.22 “Previous Turn” and “Current Turn” hits have no
effect on Japanese air raids. They are ignored.
12.23 Permanent hits can reduce the known air strength
or the air value of Japanese forces as follows. Only
permanent hits have these effects. Note that permanent
hits on a force less than level 4 would necessarily have
been infl icted by submarine attack (14.0) since any air
strike would have raised the force to Level 4.
• If a Level 1 or 2 force has permanent hits, subtract
the total number of hits from its Known Air
Strength (9.241).
• If a Level 3 force has permanent hits, subtract the
total number of hits from the Level 3 force’s Air
Value (9.25).
• A carrier with light damage (less than half of its
total hit capacity) in permanent hits loses one point
of air value per permanent hit.
• A carrier with heavy damage (half or more its total
hit capacity) loses its entire air value. If its force has
air point losses, apply the procedure of 12.24 when
computing air raid strength.
EXAMPLE: A Japanese force has the carriers
Shokaku and Zuikaku (each worth 10 air value) and
Chitose (worth 4 air value). In the fi rst Action Phase,
an American attack infl icts fi ve hits on Zuikaku.
These are registered as “Current Turn” hits. In
the second Action Phase, the Japanese force is
activated and you determine that it has launched a
raid. The force’s air value for this raid remains 24,
as the raid would have been launched prior to the
hits on Zuikaku.
12.24 When a Japanese carrier has become heavily
damaged (or more) by permanent hits, its entire air
value is lost to its force.
• In this event, only Lost air points in excess of
the carrier’s Air Value are treated as lost when
computing air raid strength. However, a portion
of the force’s Lost air points are considered to
belong to that carrier. These losses, like the
carrier’s air value, are ignored when computing
air raid strength.
• Lost points are assigned in proportion to the
number of carriers in the force, counting CVs as 2
and CVLs as 1, and rounding any fraction down.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 40

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EXAMPLE: Continuing the previous example,
suppose the Japanese force had lost ten air points,
and that it launches a raid two turns later, by which
time the hits on Zuikaku have become Permanent.
Zuikaku’s fi ve hits are more than half of its hit
capacity of 8, so this is heavy damage. Zuikaku’s
10-point air value is no longer counted, leaving only
10 for Shokaku plus 4 for Chitose. Of the ten lost air
points, two-fi fths, or 40% (4 points) are considered
to have come from Zuikaku. This is because points
are assigned in the proportion of two for Zuikaku,
two for Shokaku, and one for Chitose. The four
points belonging to Zuikaku are not counted in
the losses, leaving only 6 losses remaining of the
original 10. In sum, when computing raid strength
use an air value of 14 and air losses of 6.
DESIGN NOTE: The idea of this rule is to avoid “double
counting” air losses: you don’t penalize the Japanese
both for air points shot down and for the ship put out of
action. This rule in fact grants the Japanese a few more
air points than a precise accounting would give, but it
spares you some arithmetic and some complexity.
12.25 A Japanese carrier’s AA value suffers the same
effects as for US carriers, at each level of damage:
halved for light and heavy damage, zero if crippled.
12.26 A Japanese carrier becomes Crippled (12.4) if
all its hits (permanent and otherwise) total one or two
less than the Hit Capacity for a CV, or one less than
the Hit Capacity for a CVL. All hits are counted for this
purpose, not just permanent hits.
12.27 A Japanese carrier is sunk if it suffers permanent
hits equal to or exceeding its Hit Capacity.
12.28 The Japanese ships Ise and Hyuga were part
CVL and part battleship. Like battleships (see 12.52),
they are crippled if they take hits totalling at least 75%
of their hit capacity (12 points). They suffer the same
effects on air value at each level of damage as a CVL. In
all other respects their damage effects are the same as
for a battleship.
12.29 If following the US Air Attack Segment there
are enough hits of all types to put all fl ight decks in a
Japanese force out of action, then any CAP generated
for that force in this segment is eliminated and placed
in the Lost box.
12.3 FIRE
DESIGN NOTE: Fire was a terrible threat to carriers, as
they were packed full of aviation fuel and explosives. A
carrier might survive the immediate effect of bomb hits
but eventually be destroyed by fi re. A fi re might also
reach and detonate stored munitions -- a disaster which
caused the loss of the USS Princeton at Leyte Gulf
just a few months after this battle. US ships had the
advantage of better fi refi ghting equipment and damage
control. Obviously, fi re also affected Japanese carriers,
but the details of its progress and the fi refi ghting
attempts would not be known to you; effects of fi re on
the Japanese ships are built into the game.
12.31 A fi re may result any time a US carrier suffers
hits. Check for fi re using the Fire Outbreak Table (card
4, front). Roll one die, apply the modifi ers listed with
the table, and read the table result. If a fi re breaks out,
place a “1 Fire” marker on the ship. Note that you roll
once per segment, using the total number of hits from
all attacks made against the ship in that segment.
• There are three possible levels of fi re: 1, 2, and 3.
Fire can increase or decrease in level as a result of
the Fire Spread Table (12.33).
12.311 Fire can also start as a result of a Japanese
submarine attack on a US carrier (14.2 and Japanese
Submarine Attack Table). No additional die roll is
involved; if the table result specifi es fi re, a fi re breaks
out.
12.32 In the Fire Step during the End Phase of each
game turn (not each Action Phase) you check for
possible spread of each fi re that is raging. This includes
fi res started that turn. For each ship that is on fi re,
roll the die and consult the Fire Spread Table (card 4,
front), applying listed modifi ers.
12.33 Results on the Fire Spread Table are as follows:
Fire Extinguished - remove Fire marker
-1 fire level -- reduce fi re one level. A 1 Fire marker is
removed (same as extinguished).
+1 fire level -- increase to next fi re level. A 3 Fire
remains a 3 Fire.
+damage -- ship suffers additional damage equal to
current fi re level. For example, if the current level is 2
Fire, the ship suffers two additional damage points.
+ 2x damage -- ship suffers additional damage equal to
twice current fi re level (e.g., four points for 2 Fire).
12.34 A carrier cannot conduct any air operations
(landing, launching, raising, lowering, or servicing)
while on fi re.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA41

ers 12 33 Results on the Fire Spread Table are as follows Fire Extinguished remove Fire marker 1 fire level reduce fi re one level A 1 Fire marker is removed same as extinguished 1 fire level increase to next fi re level A 3 Fire remains a 3 Fire damage ship suffers additional damage equal to current fi re level For example if the current level is 2 Fire the ship suffers two additional damage points 2x damage ship suffers additional damage equal to twice current fi re level e g four points for 2 Fire 12 34 A carrier cannot conduct any air operations landing launching raising lowering or servicing while on fi re CARRIER BATTLE PHILIPPINE SEA41

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12.35 Fire applies only to carriers, not surface ships or
surface units. It applies only to US ships. (The progress
of fi re on Japanese ships would not be known to the
US admirals. Fire damage for the Japanese is taken
into account in the surprise modifi er.)
12.36 It is possible for a ship to have more than one fi re
if it is attacked again before the fi rst fi re is put out. Roll
separately for each fi re and track each fi re’s progress
individually.
12.4 CRIPPLED SHIPS
A carrier or battleship of either side can become crippled as a result of damage (12.16, 12.26, 12.51-12.52). You can place a Crippled marker as a reminder.
12.41 A crippled ship can remain with its force or task
group only as long as that force or task group remains
in the same hex. If the force or task group moves, the
crippled ship is placed on the map. This applies to both
sides.
12.411 If using Rule 21.0 (Surface Combat) then the
US player, when moving, can leave one or more
surface units behind in the hex with a crippled ship
if he wishes; in this case, these units remain with the
crippled ship for the rest of the game. The crippled
ship and its accompanying unit(s) move when the “US
Move” chit is drawn. This option exists only when
using Rule 21.0; otherwise the crippled ship is left by
itself. Japanese crippled ships are detached from their
forces and placed on the map as required by 12.41,
but the Japanese never leave surface units behind with
them.
12.42 A crippled ship can move only in turns ending in
“30,” e.g., 0530 -- in other words, every third turn. (The
ship is actually being towed. The towing ship is not
represented in the game.)
12.43 Crippled Japanese ships use Retirement
movement (19.0). A crippled Japanese ship moves at
the same time as its original force.
12.44 A crippled US carrier can be the target of a
Japanese air raid. However, a Japanese raid will attack
a task group fi rst. It will attack a crippled ship only if no
task group target is within 12 hexes, and only if there
is no Japanese surface force within six hexes of the
crippled ship.
12.45 Japanese surface forces within six hexes of a
crippled US ship will move directly toward that ship in
place of Mission movement, unless they are located
in a zone adjoining the east map edge, in which case
Mission movement takes priority.
12.46 When not using Rule 21.0, it is permitted for
units of either side to enter a hex occupied only by
one or more crippled enemy ships. If a US task group
enters a hex containing a crippled Japanese ship,
the ship is considered sunk (actually, scuttled by an
accompanying destroyer), and immediately removed
from play. The same applies if a Japanese surface force
enters a hex containing a crippled US carrier, unless
the surface combat and evasion rules are in force (see
21.16).
12.47 Crippled US ships can be attacked by Japanese
submarines (14.25).
12.5 SURFACE SHIP DAMAGE
12.51 US battleships can suffer damage from air raids
and in surface combat. There is a column for BBs on
the US Damage Effects Summary Chart (card 4, front).
• The chart shows the number of hits needed to
attain each damage level. Where the Damage
Effects Summary shows a pair of values (for
example, “10/12”) the fi rst value applies to
battleships having Hit Capacity 20 or lower, and
the higher value applies to battleships with a Hit
Capacity greater than 20.
• The battleship may lose AA value, go dead in the
water, or be sunk, for the values shown.
• A BB with 15+ hits is Crippled (12.4).
• A US BB unit is sunk when it suffers damage equal
to its hit capacity (20 for some BBs, 22 for others).
12.52 Japanese battleships suffer the same effects
for each level of damage as US battleships do. The
thresholds for each level of damage are as defi ned on
the Japanese Damage Effects Summary: 50% of total
hit capacity for heavy damage, 75% for crippled.
12.53 Cruiser and destroyer units of both sides (which
represent multiple ships) suffer no effects from hits
until the number of hits equals the hit capacity, at
which point the unit is removed from play.
13.0 COMMITMENT
DESIGN NOTE: The purpose of the commitment rule
is to prevent the Japanese carrier forces in the game
from growing beyond reasonable levels. Note however
that if you play (as recommended) with the Japanese
additional ships (2.35), you may end up with different
ships from those that participated in the actual battle.
This is intended; the US admirals did not know the
exact makeup of the Japanese fl eet.

CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 42

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13.1 COMMITMENT INDEX
13.11 The Japanese Commitment Index records the
approximate size of the Japanese carrier forces so
far revealed in play. It starts at zero and increases as
new forces are introduced into the game. Use the
Commitment Index marker on the General Records
Track to record the index.
13.12 The Commitment Index must be checked and
possibly adjusted each time any of the following
happen:
1. A new Japanese carrier force is revealed in play,
either in search or air raid;
2. The Known Air Strength of an existing Level 1 force
increases.
3. A Japanese carrier force increases to a higher
level, either in search or air raid.
13.13 To compute the Commitment Index, you
compute a Commitment Value for each carrier force in
play, and sum these values together. The force values
are computed as follows (see Commitment Values
Chart, card 3, back):
• For each Level 4 force, points accrue for each
carrier either in play or sunk: 2 points per CV, 1
point per CVL. (In other words, points accrue for
each carrier that joined the battle in that force, even
if it is now sunk.)
• For each Level 2 or Level 3 force, the value is
printed on the intelligence chit (white number on
black circle background).
• The commitment value of a Level 1 force is
a function of its Known Air Strength. The L1
Commitment Value Chart (card 3, back) shows
the values. If no air strength is yet known, the
commitment value for the force is taken to be 4.
It is possible for the Commitment Value computed for
the same force to decrease and then increase again as
the force goes through successive intelligence levels.EXAMPLE: Three Japanese carrier forces are in
play: a Level 1 force with known air strength of 7,
a Level 3 “2 CV” force, and a Level 4 force that has
the CVL Zuiho, and which formerly had the CVL
Chitose that is now sunk. The Level 1 force, per
the L1 Commitment Value Chart, has Commitment
Value 2 (we read from the “6” row, not “8”). The
Level 3 chit shows value 4. The Level 4 force counts
one point for each CVL, total 2. The Commitment
Index is 8.
13.2 COMMITMENT LIMITS
13.21 Each scenario (Scenario 6 and after) specifi es
a Japanese Commitment Threshold and a Japanese
Commitment Limit.
These values do not change during play. You record them by placing markers on the General Records Track. The Threshold determines when you start to see commitment effects; the Limit acts like an upper bound on the index. Also as part of the scenario setup, you will decide whether you are using the historical Japanese force posture, or using additional ships. This choice affects the operation of the commitment rules.
13.22 If the commitment index currently equals or
exceeds the commitment threshold at the time a new
carrier force is revealed, the force may turn out to be
a False Contact instead. Perform a commitment test
using the Commitment Test Table (card 3, back), as
follows:
1. Locate the line at the top of the table
corresponding to the current scenario and force
posture. If playing with historical ships only, use
the Historical line; if using Additional Ships (2.35)
use the Additional Ships line; use the Scenario 9
line only in that scenario.
2. In the line selected, locate the column
corresponding to the current commitment index.
13.221 Double forces (7.5) may not enter the game
once the commitment threshold has been exceeded. A
double force result is treated as Level 1 Carrier instead.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA43

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13.23 At the moment the Commitment Index reaches
or exceeds the Commitment Limit, immediately carry
out the following procedure for each Japanese Level
0 or Level 1 Large/Medium/Small force, starting with
those closest to the Invasion zone.
1. If the force is Level 0, draw a Level 1 chit from the
cup.
a. If the result is any type of carrier chit, remove
the force from play, as no more carrier forces
are allowed.
b. If the result is a Surface chit, place it
underneath the force and the force remains in
play, up to a maximum of four surface forces in
play (Step 3).
c. If the result is a Large, Medium, or Small Force,
immediately proceed as in Step (2).
d. If the result is False Contact, the force is
removed from play.
2. If the force is Level 1 Large, Medium, or Small,
promote it to a Level 2 force using the Level 1 to
Level 2 Intelligence Table. If the result is a surface
force, place the chit underneath the force. If the
result is a carrier force, remove it from play.
3. As soon as the Japanese have a total of at least
four surface forces on the map, the procedure
is halted, and any remaining Level 0 and Level 1
Large/Medium/Small forces are removed from
play.
13.231 If the Japanese already had four or more surface
forces in play when the Commitment Limit was reached
or exceeded, then all existing surface forces remain in
play but the procedure of 13.23 is skipped. Remove any
remaining Large/Medium/Small forces.
13.232 It can also happen that the Japanese have
only a few non-carrier forces in play when the limit is
reached. In that case you still carry out 13.23(2) for
each Large, Medium, or Small force, removing it if it
turns out to be a carrier force and keeping it in play if it
turns out to be a surface force, and stopping when you
have four surface forces in play.
13.24 After the Commitment Level has been exceeded,
the following effects apply for the remainder of the
game:
1. Level 1 carrier forces already in the game remain
in play and function normally.
2. For the rest of the game, the air raid procedure is
carried out only for forces already known to be
carrier forces.
3. No new Japanese forces arrive.
14.0 SUBMARINES
The Philippine Sea was an unusual case in which US
submarines made a large direct contribution through
attacks on enemy warships, as opposed to their usual
role of destroying the Japanese merchant marine. The
game regards the historical result -- two Japanese
carriers sunk -- as a longshot; it can occur, but it is
unlikely.
DESIGN NOTE: Concerning US submarines, the game
takes some liberties with player role. Historically the
US submarines were under the command of Admiral
C.A. Lockwood (Commander Submarines Pacifi c
Fleet), who was based at Pearl Harbor and not under
the direct control of either Admiral Spruance or
Admiral Mitscher. However, as submarines sank two
of the three Japanese carriers lost in this battle -- and
did so with no assistance from aircraft -- it seemed
unsatisfying to have such an important force not be
under the player’s control. It does appear that there
was close-coordination among the admirals involved,
and the submarines were given orders fi rmly in support
of TF 58’s mission, so perhaps the game is not too far
from reality.
14.1 US SUBMARINES
US submarines are used in scenarios 6 through 9.
14.11 There are fi ve US submarines, identifi ed by
name. In Scenario 6 and later, they are set up as part of
the US forces on map at the start. Each may be placed
anywhere on the map, including island hexes.
14.12 There is one “US Subs” activation chit. When the
US player draws this chit, he may do the following with
each of his submarines:
1. If the submarine is not pinned and not shadowing,
move the submarine one hex, if desired. Following
any movement, the submarine may attempt to
contact a Japanese force in its hex (14.13). If
the contact succeeds, the submarine can either
shadow or attack the force.
2. If the submarine is pinned, remove any Pin 1
marker and replace any Pin 2 marker with a
Pin 1 marker (14.171). In either case, the pinned
submarine takes no other action in that phase; its
activation consists solely of having its pin marker
reduced or removed.
3. If the submarine is shadowing, see 14.151.
14.13 To resolve a contact attempt, roll one die and
consult the Submarine Contact Table (card 4, front).
The result is either success or failure.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 44

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14.131 The following die roll modifi ers apply to contact
attempts:
+1 if the Japanese force did not move when most
recently activated. (This can occur as a result of
movement priority 7.21 (7)(c)).
+1 if the force moved into the submarine’s hex
-2 for “oblique approach”: the submarine moved into
the force’s hex in this activation from the quarter,
i.e., from an oblique direction with respect to the
force’s movement (see Example).
-3 for a “stern chase”: the submarine moved into the
force’s hex in this activation from directly astern
(i.e., moving the same direction the force did, from
directly behind -- see Example).
-1 if the current Action Phase is Dusk or Night
+3 versus a Crippled ship
Note: When a Japanese force is moved in a position
where US submarines might attack, you can orient the
force counter to show direction of movement.
EXAMPLE: Japanese force I moved from 1013 to
1012 in its most recent activation. The USS Stingray
enters hex 1012 from 0912. It is approaching from
the quarter and gets the oblique approach modifi er
(-2). The Finback was left behind in 1013. If it
attempts to give chase into 1012 it will suffer the
stern chase modifi er (-3).
DESIGN NOTE: The top speed of US submarines on
the surface was about 16 knots. It was diffi cult to give
chase to a Japanese force from astern, but possible
when the Japanese were operating at economical
cruising speeds. The best attack position resulted if the
submarine could wait in ambush and let the Japanese
approach.
14.14 If the contact succeeds, proceed as follows:
1. If the Japanese force was Level 0, it is promoted
to Level 1. Draw a Level 1 chit. This may reveal
that the force is a False Contact; if so, skip the rest
of the procedure.
2. A submarine which makes a successful contact
has the option to either shadow the force (14.15),
or else attack.
3. If you wish to shadow, fl ip the submarine to its
reverse (“Shadow”) side. The sub remains on this
side until it stops shadowing.
4. If you wish to attack, proceed to the attack
procedure (14.16). In this case the sub remains
face up.
Note that a submarine contact does not result in any
form of Detection.
14.141 If there are multiple Japanese forces in the
hex, and a contact attempt against one reveals a False
Contact, then the US player may attempt to contact a
different force. This can continue until either a contact
attempt fails or a real force is revealed, at which point
no further contact attempts can be made.
14.15 Shadowing: A submarine can choose to shadow
a force it has contacted. Flip the sub to its reverse,
Shadowing side. Shadowing continues until either the
player voluntarily stops shadowing (14.151) or attacks,
or the sub suffers an adverse ASW result (14.152). The
benefi t of shadowing is a favorable modifi er on air
search die rolls.
14.151 Any time the US Subs chit is drawn, a
shadowing submarine has the following options:
• It can continue shadowing, in which case it does
nothing at this time.
• It can stop shadowing. Flip the submarine face up.
The submarine may not be moved at that time.
• It can attack the force it is shadowing (only). Flip
the submarine face up, and proceed as in 14.16.
14.152 When the shadowed Japanese force is
activated, resolve an ASW attempt (14.17) against the
sub. If the sub becomes pinned, it loses contact and
ceases to shadow the force. Otherwise, it accompanies
the moving force to that force’s new hex. (Note that
there is no ASW attempt when the sub fi rst contacts,
only when the shadowed force moves.)
DESIGN NOTE: The Shadowing option simulates
keeping the force in sight while evading detection and
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA45

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and reporting its position. This was done by US
submarines in the lead-up to the battle, but on the day
of battle they opted for attack.

14.16 To carry out a submarine attack, proceed as
follows:
1. Roll one die and consult the US Submarine Attack
Table (card 4, front). This may specify no effect, or
that you obtain damage rolls. Note that there is a
die-roll modifi er for fi ring at a crippled ship.
2. For each damage roll, you roll the die again and
consult the Submarine Attack Hits Table (card 4,
front) to determine the number of hit points.
a. For a Level 4 force, all the hits are applied to one
carrier of your choice. Place “Hit - Current Turn”
markers on the affected carrier. All the hits must
be applied to one carrier; they cannot be divided
among multiple targets.
b. For any lower level carrier force, or a force of
unknown type, the hits are simply applied to the
force. Place “Hit - Current Turn” markers on the
force’s Butai Display (or for a force of unknown
type, underneath the Force counter). The hits will
be applied to individual ships later (14.162).
c. For a surface force, promote the force to level 3
and apply the hits to a single ship or unit of the
largest class present in the force (14.163).
3. Resolve an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) attack
against the sub.
14.161 Hits infl icted by submarines start out as “current
turn” hits and progress to permanent hits, the same
as hits infl icted by air strikes, and they have the same
effects on air value.
14.162 When a Japanese Level 3 carrier force that has
accumulated submarine hits becomes Level 4 choose
one carrier randomly. If any CVs are present, choose
only from among the CVs. Assign all the hits to that
carrier. If there are at that point enough permanent hits
to sink the carrier, remove it from play. Any excess
hits are forfeited. (Note that all hits incurred by a force
at Level 3 or below must be sub hits, since a force
becomes Level 4 when it undergoes air attack.)
DESIGN NOTE: A submarine would line up one target,
torpedo it, and then dive to escape the depth-charging
by the escorts. Thus, all the hits are assigned to one
target.
14.163 Submarines can attack Japanese surface forces.
If a submarine obtains hits against a surface force,
immediately promote the force to Level 3. Hits are
applied to one ship of the largest class present in the
force. For example, if the force contains battleships,
you apply the hits to one battleship.
14.164 A roll of 10 on the Submarine Attack Hits Table
requires a second roll, as stated beneath the table.
This will result either in the award of additional hits, or
(on a second roll of 10) the immediate destruction of
the target ship. (This represents some form of ‘critical
damage,’ as happened to the Japanese aircraft carrier
Taiho.) If this result is obtained against a Level 3 or
lower force, you can just place a large number of hit
markers.
14.17 Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) attacks occur
when a shadowed Japanese force moves or when a
submarine attacks. Roll one die and consult the ASW
Table (card 4, front). There is a modifi er of +1 if the
ASW attack immediately follows an attack in which the
submarine scored hits.
14.171 The possible ASW results (other than no effect)
are:
Pin 1, Pin 2 — Place a Pin marker. A Pinned sub
cannot be activated, attempt contact, attack,
shadow, or move. Pin effects can last either one or
two full turns. When the Sub chit is drawn, Pin 2
markers are replaced by Pin 1, and Pin 1 markers
are removed (but the sub cannot be activated until
the next turn).
Destroyed — Remove the submarine from play.
When any of these results occurs against a shadowing
sub, fl ip the submarine to its non-shadowing (face-up)
side.
DESIGN NOTE: The “Pin” result represents the
submarine going deep and quiet to wait out the attack.
An attack would inevitably be followed by depth-
charging, which would require the sub to dive and
hide, probably staying down for a time and losing
contact with the force. USS Cavalla, for example, was
‘pinned’ for nearly three hours following its successful
attack on Shokaku.
14.172 When attacking a lone crippled ship (not part of
any force), all odd die rolls are treated as No Effect for
ASW. For example, a die roll of 10 followed by 9, which
would normally sink the attacking sub, is treated as No
Effect.
14.18 Submarines cannot contact, attack, or shadow
Japanese air raids. An air raid moves through
submarines with no effect on either the air raid or the
submarine.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 46

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SUBMARINE EXAMPLE: The submarine Cavalla
moves into a hex containing a Level 0 Japanese
Carrier force. The US player rolls for the Submarine
Contact Table and obtains an 8, resulting in contact.
He draws a chit and obtains a Level 1 Carrier force.
He decides to attack. Using the US Submarine At-
tack Table, his attack die-roll is 10, yielding two rolls
on the Submarine Attack Hits Table. For the two hit
die rolls he obtains a 9 and a 10. The 9 gives a re-
sult of fi ve hits. For the 10, the table states he must
roll the die a second time. The second roll is 7, for
six more hits; the total is 11 hits. The US player
places 11 points of “Hit - Current turn” markers on
the force’s display.
Since the sub made an attack, the player must roll
for ASW. He rolls a 7, to which 1 is added because
the sub attacked and obtained hits. The adjusted
roll of 8 gives the result “Pinned 7, for six more hits;
the total is 11 hits. The US player places 11 points
of “Hit - Current turn” markers on the force’s dis-
play.
Since the sub made an attack, the player must roll
for ASW. He rolls a 7, to which 1 is added because
the sub attacked and obtained hits. The adjusted
roll of 8 gives the result “Pinned for 2 turns.” The
sub receives a Pin-2 marker. The next time US Subs
is drawn this will be reduced to Pin-1; the sub takes
no action. The time after that, the Pin-1 marker will
be removed, and the time after that, the sub can be
activated again.
Later in the game the Japanese force is promoted
to a Level 4 force with carriers. One of the carriers
drawn at that time is Shokaku. The 11 hits, which
by that time have become permanent hits, are as-
signed to Shokaku by random choice (rule 14.162).
Shokaku is immediately removed from play.
(Note: This is the historical attack made by the USS
Cavalla, Lt. Cmdr. Hermann J. Kossler commanding,
on June 19.)
14.2 JAPANESE SUBMARINES
14.21 There are no Japanese submarine units in the
game. But if the US player chooses to illuminate a hex
(6.43) he may suffer a submarine attack (14.22). He
may also suffer submarine attack if he has any crippled
ships on the map (14.25).
14.22 For each US-occupied hex that is illuminated at
the end of an Action Phase, roll one die and consult the
Japanese Submarine Attack Table (card 4, front). You
roll once per hex, even if multiple task groups occupy
the hex.
14.23 The result of the submarine attack may be ‘no
effect,’ or may require a second die roll to determine
the fi nal result, which may include hits, fi re, or
immediate sinking.
14.24 The results of the submarine attack are applied
to a single carrier chosen at random from those in the
hex.
14.25 Submarine attacks against crippled ships occur
at the end of each daylight game turn (not including
Dusk). Roll once per crippled ship, applying the listed
modifi er for any surface units in the same hex. Apply
any result to the crippled ship immediately.
14.26 There is no ASW attack against the Japanese
submarine. (Actually, there is, but the destroyers take
care of it and you don’t know the results.)
15.0 VICTORY CONDITIONS
DESIGN NOTE: The mission of the American fl eet
at the Battle of the Philippine Sea was to cover the
invasion of Saipan. It was not within the capabilities
of the Japanese fl eet to prevent this invasion, nor to
change the outcome of the war, which by mid-1944
Japan had clearly lost. Historically, Admiral Spruance
pursued a conservative strategy which accomplished
the mission, but was disappointing for some of Task
Force 58’s offi cers and men, who wanted to seek out
and annihilate the Japanese fl eet. And anyway, we
are wargamers. Accordingly, the victory conditions in
Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea are based on what the US
sailors wanted to achieve and on what is challenging
for the player. To win a game victory you are required
to ‘clean the table,’ not just cover the invasion. But
failing to cover the invasion hurts you badly, as that is
your primary mission.
15.1 VICTORY POINTS
Victory is determined by Victory Points.
The US player receives points:
• For damaging and sinking Japanese carriers
• For destroying Japanese naval air points.
The US player loses points:
• For damaged and sunk carriers and submarines,
and US air units eliminated.
• For Japanese forces that exit the map from the
Invasion Zone (the darker-shaded sea zone along
the east map edge and containing the islands of
Saipan and Tinian)
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA47

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Victory Point Deductions
-5 per US carrier (any type) lightly damaged
-10 per US carrier heavily damaged (4-5 hits for CV, 3
hits for CVL)
-15 per US carrier crippled (6-7 hits for CV, 4 hits for
CVL)
-25 per US CVL sunk
-35 per US CV sunk
-4 per US submarine sunk
-1 per two US air units eliminated in combat when not
in task group hex
-1 per four US air units eliminated when in task group
hex (this includes units lost in combat in that hex,
units lost on landing, and units eliminated through
damage to carriers)
-20 Each Japanese carrier to exit the map from the
Invasion Zone (7.23)
-15 Each battleship to exit from the Invasion Zone
(7.23)
-8 Each cruiser or destroyer unit to exit from the
Invasion Zone (7.23)
Note that there is a VP award for Japanese air points
actually destroyed in combat, but no separate award
for remaining air points that might have been on board
a sunken carrier (they are included in the points for the
carrier itself).
DESIGN NOTE: The deduction for US air units lost
refl ects the loss of pilots and aircrew; the high volume
of US production meant that the planes themselves
were worth little. The different awards for points
eliminated in the task group’s hex versus eliminated
in combat elsewhere refl ect the differing chances
of recovering the pilot and crew. One of the striking
differences between the US and Japanese services was
that TF 58 managed to rescue most of its downed fl iers,
while on the Japanese side, “a man who did not return
from a mission was dead” (Sakai, Samurai;
see Bibliography).
15.11 In order to determine victory points, whenever a
Japanese force exits the map from the Invasion Zone,
immediately promote it to the highest possible level
(Level 4 for carrier, Level 3 for surface) and place in the
Japanese Ships Exited box.
Net US VP Level of Victory
101+Overwhelming US Victory
History records the Philippine Sea as a success
to go alongside Midway in its effects on the war.
The Japanese navy ceases to be a factor for the
remainder of hostilities.
76-100 Substantial US Victory
The battle is judged a clear victory. The Japanese
fl eet is unable to sortie again. The Japanese turn to
kamikaze tactics.
51-75 Incomplete US Victory
The Japanese fl eet loses this battle but is still able
to contest the invasion of the Philippines. There is a
general feeling that ‘we could have done better.’ (This
was the historical outcome.)
31-50 Mixed Results
The Japanese withdraw and the invasion goes
forward, but there is much grumbling and
dissatisfaction in the fl eet, and some historians are
harsh in their judgements. (This would have been
the historical outcome but for the contribution of US
submarines.)
16-30 US Defeat
The battle is judged a Japanese victory and the
invasion is delayed. You are relieved of command
of the carrier forces and sent home to testify at a
Congressional inquiry.
15 or less Humiliating US Defeat
The invasion is seriously compromised and the
battle is judged a humiliation for American arms. You
are court-martialed and then sent to command the
naval depot at Stuber Forks, Iowa. The local paper
publishes a stiffl y worded article which omits all
mention of the battle. (Those familiar with the novel
The Caine Mutiny may recognize this outcome.)
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 48

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CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA49

ADVANCED RULES
The following rules sections provide additional
simulation detail, additional tactical and strategic
considerations, game variation, or more challenge.
They can be used with any scenario from Scenario
6 onward. (Some can also be used with earlier
scenarios, as noted.) The Advanced Rules can be used
singly or in any combination, as the player wishes.
16.0 LAND AIR REINFORCEMENTS
DESIGN NOTE: The Japanese had about 500 aircraft
in the general area of the Philippine Sea, and tried to
shuttle some of them to Guam during the battle. Many
of these were intercepted by US fi ghters. Admiral
Ozawa’s plan presumed that essentially all these 500
aircraft would be deployed in support of his operation;
in this he was badly disappointed. This rule allows for a
level of land air more in line with what Admiral Ozawa
expected.
16.1 LAND AIR REINFORCEMENT PROCEDURE
With this rule, the Japanese may receive land air
reinforcements from Iwo Jima and from Yap (the latter
represents aircraft from Yap, Peleliu, and neighboring
islands).
16.11 The Activation chits for Yap/Peleliu and Iwo Jima
are added to the activation chit cup beginning with the
0810 turn of each day. They are not used on the fi rst
two game turns of each day.
16.12 When the Activation Chit for either Yap or Iwo
Jima is drawn, carry out the following procedure:
1. Roll the die. If the roll is “9” or “10”, there is an air
reinforcement; proceed to the next step.
2. Roll the die again and consult the Land Air
Reinforcement Strength Table (card 4, front) to
determine the number of points received. Note that
the outcome on June 19 can include a modifi er to
be applied to rolls for this table for the same base
on June 20.
3. The new air points can be taken in any
denomination of counters. They are put in play per
rule 16.2.
4. Remove this Activation Chit from play for the
remainder of the day. In other words, there can be
only one air reinforcement per source land base per
day. In two-day scenarios there can be one on June
19 and one on June 20. A chit drawn on June 19 is
restored to the cup on the 0810 turn of June 20.
16.2 LAND AIR REINFORCEMENT ARRIVAL
16.21 If there is a US task group within two hexes of
Guam in any direction, or if there is a US intercept
mission in or adjacent to the Guam hex, then the
reinforcements are placed on the map as though they
were an air raid coming to attack Guam.
1. Treat Guam as the target hex and use the Intercept
Range Table to determine the distance.
2. Count hexes in that distance toward the point of
origin by the most direct straight-line route.
a. For reinforcements from Yap/Peleliu, the point of
origin is the island of Yap (hex 2219)
b. For reinforcements from Iwo Jima, the point of
origin is hex 0109.
3. The air points are then placed on the map and
move towards Guam in the same way a raid moves
towards its target. They can be intercepted the
same as a raid.
4. When the reinforcement arrives at the Guam hex, it
must fi ght air-to-air combat against any US fi ghters
in the hex. Following the air-to-air combat, the
reinforcing units land.
• The air value of Guam is immediately increased
by the number of points that landed. Adjust the
Guam Air Value marker on the Records Track.
• The air points are placed in the Landed box on the
Guam display. They progress from there the same
as points landed from a raid.
16.22 If there is no US task group within two hexes
of Guam in any direction, and also no US intercept
mission in or adjacent to the Guam hex, then the units
immediately arrive at Guam.
17.0 LEEWARD MOVEMENT
DESIGN NOTE: The wind blew steadily from the east
on June 19-20, 1944, as it most commonly does in the
vicinity of the Marianas at that time of year. As carriers
needed to steam into the wind to launch or recover
planes, this wind gave the Japanese an advantage: the
US could close the range on the Japanese fl eet only
by steaming to leeward (away from the wind) and thus
reducing their air operations.

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The Leeward Movement rule increases both realism
and player challenge. It is recommended for use
primarily in two-day scenarios (Scenarios 8 and 9). It
can be used in single-day scenarios, but may make the
game extremely challenging.
At the end of each US Move segment, check Task
Force 58 and each detached carrier task group for
leeward movement, as follows:
• A TF or TG which moves away from the
current wind direction -- either directly away,
or diagonally away (see Example) receives a
Leeward Move marker. Note that there are three
leeward and three windward directions from any
hex.
• A TF or TG that remains in its hex and does not
move receives a Station Keeping marker.
• A TF or TG that moves toward the wind (opposite
from leeward) receives no marker, and any
existing Leeward Move or Station Keeping marker
is removed.
Leeward Movement applies only to Task Force 58 and
carrier task groups.
17.1 Once placed, a Leeward Movement or Station
Keeping marker remains in place until the end of the
next activation of that TF or TG. The condition of
moving leeward or station keeping is thus in effect from
activation to activation. It affects fl ight operations in
that interval, as described in 17.2 and 17.3.
EXAMPLE: Wind is blowing due west (toward
the left-hand side of the image). Task Force 58 is
located in hex 1013. It would receive a Leeward
Move marker if it moves to 0913, 1014, or 1113.
You can place the Wind Direction marker in the corner
of the map to record the direction.
17.2 A task group marked with a Leeward Move marker
suffers the following effects:
• It can launch or land (not both) at most one air unit
(for the entire task group) in that phase.
• Any existing CAP mission must immediately be
placed on the map and assigned a fuel marker
(4.34).
DESIGN NOTE: Planes on CAP had to be constantly
cycled for refueling, which required launches and
landings.
17.3 A task group marked with a Station Keeping
marker suffers the following effects:
• Each CV in the task group can either launch one
air unit or land one air unit (not both) per action
phase.
• One CVL in the task group can either launch one
air unit or land one air unit per action phase. The
other CVL or CVLs cannot launch or land any air
units in that phase. A different CVL may be chosen
to launch or land an air unit each action phase.
17.4 A task group moving to windward (no
Leeward Movement or Station Keeping marker)
has full air operations capacity as described in
earlier rules.
17.5 A Leeward Movement marker may already
be
in place at the start of a scenario, as per scenario
instructions. In this case the marker affects air
operations through the end of the task group’s initial
activation.
17.6 (Optional) Variable Wind Direction: The wind
direction historically was from east to west. Players
who wish to explore other possibilities can make a die
roll using the following table before the start of the
scenario:
The wind does not change during the game.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 50

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18.0 ADVANCED SEARCH OPTIONS
DESIGN NOTE: These rules add more options, choices,
and detail to the search system. Rules 18.1 and 18.3
together enable the exact sequence of events which
happened in the US searching of the Japanese fl eet
on June 20, 1944. I am grateful to John D. Burtt for
suggesting options 18.1 and 18.4.
18.1 SHADOWING
The shadowing option allows a searching unit on its
outbound leg to forego further searches in return for a
second search against the same target.
18.11 A search mission on the outbound leg which
obtains an ‘S’ or ‘L’ result has the option to shadow the
detected force.
1. Place the shadowing mission on top of the force it is
shadowing.
2. In the next Search Phase, it will make a second
search attempt against the shadowed force (only).
A +1 die-roll modifi er is applied. If the force should
move in the meantime, the shadowing force moves
with it.
3. In the Search Phase after that, it will return direct
to its carrier from the hex where it shadowed. It does
not conduct any searches in the sector where the
shadowed force was, but it can conduct searches in the
closer sectors.
18.12 The option to shadow must be exercised
immediately when the search result is obtained. The
unit then does not search any other forces in that
sector. Search results already obtained against other
forces in that sector stand.
18.13 When resolving normal searches in the long
range sector (7-10 hexes), a player may exercise a
shadowing option only against a force at range 7-8
hexes. He foregoes any further searches against any
other forces in that range sector.
18.14 A shadowing search mission gains a +1 modifi er
in its second search (only) against the shadowed
force. Please note this should not be confused with
the modifi er for a shadowing submarine (14.15). It is
possible that both could apply.
18.15 The shadowing decision is per mission not per
unit. If two units are on the search mission, either both
must shadow or neither.
18.2 EXTENDED SEARCH RANGE
DESIGN NOTE: This option simulates the use of
fi ghters equipped with drop tanks (extra fuel) for longer
range search.
18.21 A search mission composed only of fi ghters
may search out to 12 hexes. The Max Radius marker is
placed 12 hexes away from the hex of origin.
18.22 The mission searches the zones for 0-2 hexes,
3-6 hexes, and 7-10 hexes normally. In the next Search
Phase after it has searched the 7-10 hex zone, it moves
two additional hexes (to 12 hexes total distance) and
searches all forces at a distance of 11 or 12 hexes. On
the following turn it returns to the 10-hex distance,
searching the 11-12 hex zone again. It then returns
normally to the carrier.
18.23 If a fi ghter air search mission contacts an enemy
force that turns out to be any type of carrier force
(Level 1 Carrier, or any Level 2 through 4 force with
carriers), the air search mission must immediately turn
around and return to the carrier. It searches zones on
its return leg normally.
DESIGN NOTE: It is presumed that if the fi ghters
contact an enemy carrier force they will be engaged
by CAP, or at least threatened, and have to drop their
tanks.
18.24 The printed modifi ers for fi ghters in search apply
to Extended Search as well.
18.3 LOCATION UNCERTAINTY
DESIGN NOTE: The “?” result implies less precise
information about the enemy force, which may
extend to its location. When the Japanese fl eet was
detected on June 20, a second contact report (the
shadowing option, in game terms) corrected the
position to be 60 miles further out, which made a
big difference as strikes had already been launched.
18.31 When you obtain an “S” or “L” detection result
against a force that already has a “?” marker, the force
may change location. You roll the die twice, once to
determine the direction of the possible change, and a
second time to determine the distance.
18.32 Roll the die once for direction, on Table 1.
18.33 Having selected a direction, roll the die a second
time to determine how far to displace the force in that
direction on Table 2.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA51

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18.34 Immediately place the force in the hex indicated
(direction and distance). Air raids the force has in the
air are not affected.
18.4 MORNING SEARCHES
18.41 With this option, on the 0530 turn of June 19 the
US Search Segment is conducted prior to the Japanese
Arrival Phase (different from the usual play sequence).
Thus, the US player must decide on his searches
before having any information about where Japanese
forces arrive.
19.0 RETIREMENT
DESIGN NOTE: The Retirement rule covers several
situations in which Japanese forces abandon the
normal scheme of advancing toward the enemy, and
instead withdraw toward the west side of the map.
19.1 A Japanese force will switch to retirement
movement in any of the following situations:
• A Level 4 carrier force in which all the carriers
have been sunk or crippled.
• A surface force that has fought a surface action
and lost a battleship, or if it had no battleships, a
cruiser unit sunk or crippled.
• A crippled ship (12.4).
• In scenario 8, if rule 20.0 (Japanese Refueling) is
in play then all Japanese forces in the western
map section (2.13) retire.
When a force meets any of these conditions, fl ip it to its
reverse (Retiring) side.
19.2 A force using retirement movement moves using
the Mission Movement compasses, but moves in
the opposite of the die roll direction. There are two
exceptions:
1. If currently located less than nine hexes away from
the closest US task group, it must move away from
the US task group. Subject to this, it will move
as nearly as possible in the required retirement
direction.
2. If you are using the Japanese Refueling rule, then a
retiring force moves toward an oiler unit (20.5) until
it is refueled or abandons refueling. Subsequent to
that, it moves as described above.
19.3 A retiring carrier force does not launch air raids. It
can still have CAP.
19.4 When either component of a double force (7.5)
retires, the double force ceases to act as a double
force, and moves as two independent forces thereafter.
20.0 JAPANESE REFUELLING
DESIGN NOTE: By mid-1944 oil was a serious problem
for the Japanese navy. Japanese movements on
the morning of the 20th were dictated by the need to
refuel. Had the Japanese not been compelled to delay
several hours attempting to refuel, they probably would
have escaped the battle area without the sunset air
strike that evening. This rule can be used to re-create
this aspect of the battle.
20.1 The Refueling rule applies only to scenario 8. The
rule governs Japanese movement on the night of June
19-20 and the morning of June 20.
20.2 Japanese oiler units A, B, and C are used with this
rule. (Each one represents a supply fl eet consisting of
several ships.) They arrive as reinforcements on the
Dusk turn (1850) of June 19.
20.3 Place one oiler by random choice in one of the
hexes labelled “Oil-1”; place the second by random
choice in an “Oil-2” hex; and place the third in an “Oil-
3” hex.
20.4 Oiler units cannot be attacked. They never move.
20.5 When using this rule, all Japanese forces in the
western map section (2.13), both carrier and surface,
start using Retirement movement as of the Dusk turn
on June 19. The standard retirement movement is
modifi ed, however. Each force moves directly to the
nearest oiler unit (if equidistant, choose one randomly
and then move to that one). After entering the oiler’s
hex, it must remain in that hex until it succeeds in
refueling (20.61). After refueling, the force continues to
use normal retirement movement until it exits the map.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 52

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20.6 One force may attempt to refuel from each oiler
unit each Action Phase. The attempt is made when the
force is activated. If more than one force is present in
the hex, refuel them in the order they entered the hex
(you can stack them to record the order). A double
force refuels as one force.
20.61 Refueling succeeds on a die roll of 1 through 4.
If the aircraft carrier Taiho has entered the game and
been sunk or crippled, refueling succeeds only on 1
through 3.
DESIGN NOTE: The Taiho was the Japanese fl eet
fl agship, and after its sinking the Japanese experienced
a great deal of confusion attempting to organize the
fl eet for refueling.
20.7 Any force that is Spotted or Located by an
American air search abandons its efforts to refuel and
uses normal retirement movement for the rest of the
game.
20.8 All Japanese oiler units are removed at the start of
the 1330 turn of June 20, and all Japanese forces use
normal Retirement movement from then on.
21.0 SURFACE COMBAT
DESIGN NOTE: Surface action at this battle was
unlikely, but was nonetheless an option considered
by both sides. The rules here are a highly simplifi ed
representation of the types of combat likely to occur
in this game -- the most probable case being if surface
units were sent to mop up crippled enemy ships.
Players who want to save the time can use Special Rule
1 from Scenario 6 instead of this rules section. But for
those who don’t mind adding these rules, it should be
noted that the forces at this battle included the most
powerful battleships ever to serve in their respective
navies, or any others.
Each time US and Japanese forces fi nd themselves
in the same hex following a move by one side or the
other, carry out the following procedure. Note that the
procedure is symmetric; it does not matter which side
was moving.
1. If the Japanese force is at intelligence level lower
than 3, promote it to Level 3 immediately, using
the usual tables, drawing specifi c ship/surface
units in the case of a surface force.
2. Determine whether the Japanese force accepts
battle (21.11), or attempts to evade.
3. The US player chooses whether to accept battle or
evade.
a. If both forces are evading, apply rule 21.13, and
skip the remaining steps of the procedure.
b. If only one side wishes to evade, resolve the
evasion attempt (21.14).
4. If both forces either accepted battle or failed to
evade, resolve surface combat (21.2).
5. Following surface combat, one side withdraws
(21.26).
21.1 EVASION
21.11 A Japanese surface force will accept battle under
either of the following conditions
1. It is a night turn, and the force is any type of
surface force;
2. It is a day turn, and the Japanese force contains
at least one battleship and at least half as many
battleships as the US force. (Round fractions up:
for example, “at least half” of three would require
two battleships, not one.)
If either of these conditions applies, the Japanese force
accepts battle. If neither condition applies, it attempts
to evade. A carrier force, or any force not known to be
a surface force, will always evade.
21.12 The US player may accept or attempt to evade
any surface combat, at his option.
21.13 If both the Japanese and the US wish to evade,
there is no combat and the evasion is automatic. Each
side retreats (21.15).
21.14 If only one side wishes to evade, the evasion is
resolved as follows:
1. Roll the die once for each side. If the evading
force contains carriers, add four to its die roll. This
modifi er applies only to the evading force.
2. If the evading force’s modifi ed die roll is greater
than or equal to the other force’s, the evasion
succeeds.
21.15 A force that successfully evades retreats from the
hex. If it was the moving force, it retreats to its original
hex. Otherwise, it retreats one hex due west (for the
Japanese) or due east (for the US).
21.16 Crippled ships do not take part in surface combat.
If enemy surface ships/units enter a hex occupied only
by a crippled ship, the crippled ship is sunk.
21.161 Crippled ships cannot evade. A force that
evades leaves any crippled ships behind. If the enemy
force remains in the hex (i.e., does not also evade), the
crippled ships are considered sunk.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA53

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CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 54
21.2 SURFACE COMBAT RESOLUTION
Surface combat is resolved as follows:
1. If this is a Night game turn, roll one die to
determine surprise (21.21)
2. Resolve a fi rst round of combat with ships eligible
to fi re in the fi rst round (21.22).
3. Resolve a second, identical round with ships
eligible to fi re in the second round.
21.21 If the combat is taking place on a Night game
turn, roll one die to determine surprise. On a roll of 10
the Japanese are surprised, on a roll of 1-2 the US is
surprised.
21.22 Surface combat is resolved in two rounds.
• In day combat, only the heaviest class of ships
present (both sides included) fi res in the fi rst
round. In the second round, the heaviest class
present on each side fi res, and all units of the
same or heavier class on the other side also fi re.
(If one side has lighter ships, this means that those
ships will not fi re until the second round, at which
point all ships of the same weight on the other side
will also engage.)
• In night combat, if one side was surprised
then none of its units can fi re in the fi rst round.
Otherwise, at night all ships may fi re in both
rounds.
EXAMPLE: If BB Musashi and a Cruiser force were
to fi ght USS Iowa and CruDiv 6 in the daytime,
only Musashi and Iowa would fi re (in both rounds).
If instead of Iowa the US had DesDiv 106 (and no
battleships), then in the fi rst round only Musashi
would fi re; in the second round CruDiv 6 (the
heaviest unit on the US side) could fi re, and the
Japanese Cruiser force (same weight as CruDiv 6)
could also fi re. DesDiv 106 would not fi re in either
round. The only way destroyers can ever fi re in a
day action is if all ships on one side are destroyers,
in which case all ships on both sides will fi re in the
second round.
DESIGN NOTE: The rules presume that a day action
would be long-range gunfi re, whereas a night action
would be at much closer range and more confused.
21.23 In each round, match up Japanese ships fi ring
against targets by the following procedures. Note that
a Japanese ship can fi re against a US target even if that
target is ineligible to fi re.
• In combat on a day turn (including dusk), all
Japanese units fi ring are matched up with
US targets in order of weight. Match all the
battleships fi rst, then all the cruisers. Each is
matched against the heaviest target not yet being
attacked (choosing randomly to break ties). If all
targets are being attacked, then start again with
the heaviest US target and match up two against
each, and so on. For purposes of this rule all
battleships are considered equally heavy, then all
cruiser units, and fi nally all destroyer units.
• In a night turn, carry out the above procedure for
all Japanese battleships and cruisers. Then start
again with the destroyers, beginning with the
heaviest target.
EXAMPLE: A Japanese force consisting of
BB Yamato, BB Musashi, a Cruiser force, and
a Destroyer force battles the USS Iowa, USS
Alabama, CruDiv 6, and DesDiv 106 in a daytime
action. Since this is a daytime action, only the
heaviest ships present (battleships) will fi re in the
fi rst round. Yamato chooses randomly between
Iowa and Alabama, and selects Iowa. Then
Musashi fi res against Alabama since that is the
heaviest target not yet being attacked.
EXAMPLE: The same ships are engaged in a
nighttime action. In this case all ships on both
sides fi re. The battleships would select targets as
in the previous example. The Cruiser force would
then attack CruDiv 6 since that is the heaviest
target not yet engaged. Finally, the Destroyer
force picks a target, starting over with the heaviest
targets. The Destroyer force would attack either
Iowa or Alabama, choosing randomly.

---

DESIGN NOTE: By this point in the war, the destroyer
forces on both sides tended to operate independently
and attack the biggest targets, while the battleships and
heavy cruisers fought in line of battle together.
21.24 The US player may match up his ships against
Japanese targets in whatever manner he prefers,
subject to the following:
• No enemy ship/unit may be attacked by two fi ring
units until all enemy ships/units of the same weight
class (battleship, cruiser, destroyer) have been
attacked by one.
• All fi rer/target matchups must be declared in
advance of any die rolls. If you forget to assign a
unit, it does not shoot.
21.25 Each unit’s fi re is resolved using the Surface
Combat Fire Table (card 4, back), as follows:
1. Destroyers fi ring in night actions use the Torpedo
column of the table (21.26). Otherwise, the
column is determined by an attack-minus-defense
differential. Note that Japanese cruisers also get
a torpedo attack in the fi rst round of night combat
(21.261).
2. Defense values for each type of target are listed
with the table (not printed on the counters).
Subtract the defense value from the attack value.
3. Locate the highest table column that does not
exceed the net attack value. Roll one die, apply
modifi ers listed with the table, and cross reference
to obtain a number of hits.
4. Damage markers are placed for all hits. Use
permanent hit markers. All damage takes effect
at the end of the round. (Note, there is no use
of “current turn” / “previous turn” hits in surface
combat.)
5. Any ship in surface combat that reaches a
Crippled damage level is considered to be sunk
(remove from play).
21.26 Destroyers fi ring at night use the Torpedo
column of the table. The target type does not matter.
There are modifi ers for Japanese units fi ring and for
surprise.
21.261 Japanese cruiser units in the fi rst round of night
combat may make an attack on the Torpedo column
in addition to their regular fi ring. The two attacks are
made against the same target. This special attack
is made only at night and only in the fi rst round of
combat.
21.27 Following a surface combat, the side that lost
more ships sunk retreats one hex following the same
rule as for evasion (21.15). If losses were equal, both
sides withdraw. Note that ships at a crippled damage
state are considered sunk (21.25(5)).
21.28 A Japanese force that has fought a surface
combat and lost a battleship sunk (or if it had no
battleships, a cruiser unit) must use Retirement
movement (19.0) for the rest of the game. Flip it to its
Retiring side.

22.0 NIGHT AIR OPERATIONS
Only the F6F-3 US air units can conduct
night air operations.
22.1 Night-capable units may launch and
land at night, the same as in the day. They
can be launched only for search or intercept missions.
22.2 Night-capable units may search at night, but there
is an adverse die-roll modifi er for searches on night
turns.
22.3 Night-capable units can, if the player chooses,
operate during day turns the same as any other units.
22.4 A night-capable unit that launches or searches
during a night turn is removed from play after it lands.
It is not destroyed and does not entail a victory point
penalty; it just is not available to be used again. (The
crew needs to rest.)
22.5 Night-capable units that operate during any day
turn of June 19 cannot launch or search during any
turn that night. (It may be helpful to keep the night units
inverted on the task group display as long as they are
not used.)
22.6 If any night-capable units launch from a carrier at
night, the takeoff and landing capacity of the carrier is
reduced by 1 throughout the fi rst day turn following.
22.7 Night-capable units require a die roll on the Safe
Return Table (card 1, back) if they are fuel critical, but
modifi ers for dusk or night do not apply.
DESIGN NOTE: You can use the night units either in
the night role or as regular day fi ghters but not both.
This refl ects the need for crew rest. The limitation of
22.6 simulates the same issue, but for the deck crews,
who also need to rest sometime. It may have been this
latter consideration that caused Admiral Mitscher not to
undertake any night missions. Some sources suggest
that he may also have distrusted the planes’ night
capabilities.
CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA55

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CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 56
23.0 SHUTTLE RAIDS TO GUAM
DESIGN NOTE: Historically, most of the planes
from the fourth (and last) Japanese raid on June 19
attempted to shuttle to Guam instead of returning to
their carriers. Many of them were intercepted and shot
down on the way.
23.1 If the target of a Japanese air raid is within four
hexes of Guam, there is a chance the raid may divert to
land on Guam instead of returning to its carrier.
23.2 After the raid has completed its air-to-surface
combat, roll one die and subtract four from the value.
If the net result exceeds the distance to Guam, the raid
diverts.
23.3 If the raid diverts, proceed as follows:
1. The air mission fl ies to Guam by the most direct
straight-edge route. It may be intercepted by US
fi ghters on the way.
2. When it reaches Guam, after air-to-air combat with
any US fi ghters in the Guam hex, the remaining
air points land. Immediately increase the Guam
air value by the number of surviving points in the
raid, adjusting the Guam Air Value marker on the
Records Track.
3. Replace the Naval Air Points by an equal number
of Land Air Points and place these in the Landed
box on the Guam display.
4. Place the original Naval Air Points in the Lost box
of the Butai Display. However, the US player does
not receive victory points for these. (You can either
keep them in a separate pile or make a note.) Note
that you place the air points in the Lost box since
those points are effectively lost to the force which
launched them. This way they will be correctly
accounted for when launching future strikes.

24.0 ADDITIONAL VARIANTS
You can use any or all of the following additional
variants to re-balance any of scenarios 6 through 9 as
you gain skill and experience with the game.
24.1 TG 58.1 NOT PRESENT
Remove TG 58.1 (all its ships and aircraft) from the
starting US forces. Historically, this task group was on a
raid to Iwo Jima during the days before the battle; this
variant assumes that American intelligence had been
less effective and the battle had opened before TG 58.1
returned.
24.2 LESS EFFECTIVE INTERCEPTION
American air interception was highly effective during
the battle. This was a combination of remarkable
work by US fi ghter direction, and a lucky break in
the weather: conditions were almost perfect to spot
incoming raids. To simulate a less favorable outcome
with either or both of these factors, subtract two from
all die rolls on the Intercept Range Table. This is in
addition to the modifi er for Dusk, should that apply.
(For even more challenge, you can subtract a greater
value such as three or even four.)
24.3 NO US SUBMARINES
This variant assumes that the US submarine fl eet had
been fully deployed on a more distant patrol line and/or
against Japanese commerce, rather than in the battle
area. Remove all US submarines from the starting
forces.
24.4 NEW JAPANESE AIRCRAFT TYPES
The Japanese were working on some newer types of
aircraft, but never managed to deploy these widely
with the fl eet; they fought this battle with many of the
same planes they had been using in 1942. This was in
contrast to the US fl eet which had new -- and in the
case of fi ghters and torpedo bombers, much improved
-- types across the board. Assume a wider deployment
of new Japanese types, and modify die rolls as follows:
Add 1 to add Japanese air-to-air and air-to-surface
rolls, and subtract 1 from all US air-to-air combat rolls
against Japanese fi ghters.
CREDITS
Game Design: Jon Southard
Artistic Design and Graphics: Bruce Yearian
Rules Editor: Przemek Bozek and Michael Neubauer
Lead Playtesters: John D. Burtt, John Vasilakos,
and Jack Polonka.
Playtesters: Chris Schall, Kirk Allton, Przemek
Bozek, Rob Doane, Greg Geissler, Nathan Porter,
Andrew Southard, Darrell Kienzle, and
Tim Zagurskie.
Editorial Review and Consulting: Jack Greene
Gratitude also to the hundreds of players of Carrier
who have shared their observations on many
forums over the years.

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CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA57
DESIGN NOTES
The Battle of the Philippine Sea is an exciting game
situation in several respects. It was the last carrier-to-
carrier battle in history, and by far the largest in terms
of numbers of carriers and planes involved. (Leyte Gulf
does not really count in this respect, as the Japanese
carriers had hardly any aircraft and were used as
sacrifi cial bait.) It was also the last time the Imperial
Japanese Navy sailed into battle believing it had a
chance of decisive victory. Ever since the start of the
war the Japanese had sought “decisive battle” with the
US Navy; the Philippine Sea was their last try.
The Marianas campaign was indeed decisive, but not
the way the Japanese hoped: it shattered their inner
defense line and led to the fall of the Tojo government.
I am grateful now to have the chance to apply the ideas
behind the game Carrier (Victory Games, 1990), the
continued success of which has been deeply gratifying
to me, to this new situation.
Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea attempts to improve
the two aspects of the original Carrier design that
I wished could have been done better: I wished it
could have been less complex, and I wished there
had been less written record-keeping. The Philippine
Sea situation does not involve Japanese transports
or amphibious landings, which allows a savings in
complexity. I am also hopeful that we have simplifi ed
some of the concepts -- such as revealed air strength
-- which were most challenging in the original game.
Some new play-aids have replaced the written record-
keeping. Carrier Battle: Philippine Sea remains a
complex game to learn, but we’ve tried to compensate
for that by including numerous scenarios and variants
so that your time is well rewarded.
One signifi cant change which players of the former
game will notice right away concerns the unit scale.
US air units now represent 12 aircraft each; ship units,
apart from capital ships, represent more than one
ship. This change was necessary given the scale of
this battle. There were 15 US aircraft carriers and more
than 900 aircraft embarked, more than in all the South
Pacifi c battles put together, and it is estimated that the
Japanese lost about as many planes in this one battle
as they did in the entire Guadalcanal campaign. All the
tables have been recalibrated to refl ect both this scale
change and the plane and pilot qualities of 1944.
The decision to aggregate the Japanese surface
ships (apart from capital ships) into amorphous ‘cruiser
force’ and ‘destroyer force’ counters not only makes
the game more manageable, it also fi ts better with
the idea that you know only what the admirals would
know. Air search reports concentrated on capital ships;
they would not identify enemy forces down to the last
destroyer. In any case, with surface combat a much
less important possibility here than in the Solomons,
it was not necessary to show the surface forces in full
detail.
Other changes represent specifi c factors of great
importance in this battle, some of them refl ecting
changes in the practice of carrier warfare between 1942
and 1944. The interception mechanic, refl ecting the
success of American radar-guided fi ghter direction,
is the most obvious. This change also gives a greater
tactical feel to strikes. The search system has also
been modifi ed to provide more options for the player,
since the use of these options was among the most
important command decisions of the battle. There is
more detail over the issue of aircraft fuel expenditure,
as this was so critical on the second day of the battle.
And of course, there is the combat role of submarines,
which was omitted from the original Carrier game but
could not be omitted here.
Among the changes from 1942 to 1944, one of the
most obvious was that the fl eets of 1944 were better
able to defend themselves. Anti-aircraft fi re -- especially
on the American side -- had improved signifi cantly,
both in number of weapons and in fi re direction, over
that of 1942. There was also better fi refi ghting and
damage control. It remained true that there was a great
deal of luck involved. A large number of planes might
attack and get no hits, but just a few hits could destroy
a carrier, especially if they caught it with planes on
deck.
The balance of air-to-air fi ghting had shifted by 1944
in favor of the Americans. The F6F Hellcat fi ghter was
much more effective than its predecessor the F4F
Wildcat, while the Japanese were still fl ying essentially
the same Zero fi ghters with which they had attacked
Pearl Harbor. And Japanese aircrews no longer had
the advantages of training and experience they had
enjoyed in the earlier days: most of the Japanese pilots
at this battle were hastily trained wartime replacements
for the men lost in the battles of 1942-43. The Japanese
training program was much less successful than the US
one. You will see all this refl ected in the game in large
numbers of Japanese air unit losses, which mirrors the
actual outcome.
As in the original Carrier game, a core design
principle is that at the start of the game you do not
know the forces deployed against you. To allow for
more variation we have included a number of ships
which didn’t take part in the actual battle, but which

advantages of training and experience they had enjoyed in the earlier days most of the Japanese pilots at this battle were hastily trained wartime replacements for the men lost in the battles of 1942 43 The Japanese training program was much less successful than the US one You will see all this refl ected in the game in large numbers of Japanese air unit losses which mirrors the actual outcome As in the original Carrier game a core design principle is that at the start of the game you do not know the forces deployed against you To allow for more variation we have included a number of ships which didn t take part in the actual battle but which

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CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA 58
might have done so had they been outfi tted in time
and had air groups been made available. These include
the supercarrier Shinano (built on the hull of a Yamato-
class battleship) and the converted “battleship-carrier”
vessels Ise and Hyuga. I hope you enjoy trying out
these unique warships.
Concerning Shinano, a point of detail. Historically
the ship was sunk on its fi tting-out voyage by the US
submarine Archerfi sh. At that time Shinano had not yet
been outfi tted with its watertight partition doors and
other essential equipment. For this game we assume
that these items would have been fi tted before the ship
went into battle. Thus, Archerfi sh’s attack can’t happen
in this game. In game terms, the ship Archerfi sh
attacked would have had a defense value of about ‘10’
or at most ‘12,’ so the sinking would be possible using
our submarine attack tables.
One thing you will not fi nd in the game is US fl ying
boats. While these played a very valuable role in
the South Pacifi c, they operated under signifi cant
handicaps in this battle and their contribution was
negligible. Their effect is factored into the Japanese
arrival.
The US fl eet’s many advantages in numbers,
equipment, and experience would work against an
enjoyable two-player game, as it would not be much
fun to play the Japanese, but make for a good solitaire
one. Historically Admiral Spruance fought the battle
conservatively and defensively, sinking just one
Japanese carrier through air action (the others were
lost to submarines). Yet he clearly accomplished his
primary mission of covering the amphibious invasion.
In order to make a challenging game, we demand
that the US player do more, and ‘clean the slate’ by
also destroying most of the Japanese carrier force.
To do this, the US player will need to search more
aggressively and take more risks than his historical
counterparts did. This in turn can lead to disaster if
the US player isn’t careful or is unlucky. We’ve also
included a what-if scenario (scenario 7) so you can
explore what might have happened had Spruance
made a different decision.
Those who want an even more demanding challenge
and don’t mind an exercise in historical speculation are
encouraged to try the Great Carrier Battle of the Pacifi c
scenario. This assumes that instead of expending their
forces on the far perimeter of an over-stretched empire,
the Japanese saved their fl eet -- with its experienced
aviators -- for a decisive battle closer to home. The
result is a great brawl -- essentially, the best of Japan’s
ships and aviators against the best of America’s --
which surpasses anything that occurred in the real war.
Production of a top-fl ight game requires a top-fl ight
team, and it has been my good fortune to work with a
playtest crew whose skill and dedication rivalled that of
the US fi ghter pilots. John Burtt, a longtime friend, was
kind enough to join a test session on the spur of the
moment at ConsimWorld Expo, and ended up giving
months of his time (and long experience as designer
and game reviewer) in fi eld test. John Vasilakos, a
new colleague, is by profession a naval architect
and generously contributed his great knowledge and
experience of everything navy blue. Jack Polonka
joined the project late and did a super job tying up all
the loose ends. At the fi nal round of production testing
we were blessed by some outstanding new colleagues:
Chris Schall, Przemek Bozek, Kirk Allton, and Rob
Doane did a great job checking all the scenarios with
actual production art and putting the fi nal polish on
the project. Bill Thomas and the rest of the Compass
team were, as always, a great pleasure to work with. A
special salute to Bruce Yearian for his amazing artwork
and tireless efforts throughout. Much gratitude also
to Michael Neubauer for his rules edit, to John Kranz
for hustling up playtesters, and to Joe Balkoski, Mark
Herman, and Jack Greene for helpful and thought-
provoking conversations. And fi nally, my deep thanks
to all the players who have shared their thoughts about
Carrier on various internet forums over the years. I
have read it all and learned from it all and I am grateful.
It is my hope that we have here maintained -- and
enhanced -- the qualities that have earned Carrier a
loyal following over 30 years, and that we also have
cleaned up some of the points that made the original
game diffi cult. And it’s my hope that this new game will
give wargamers, for the fi rst time, a full appreciation of
this great and important battle. I wish you good gaming
and I look forward to your comments and questions
online.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
USSBS - Interrogations of Japanese Offi cials.
Interrogation Nav #3 (USSBS No. 32), Admiral Jisaburo
Ozawa, Battle of the Philippine Sea, 16 October 1945.
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/IJO/IJO-
3.html.
“F6F Performance” [records from various
wartime performance tests]. http://www.
wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f6f/f6f.html
“SB2C Helldiver” Avialogs archive [wartime
performance tests and manuals]. http://www.avialogs.
com/index.php/aircraft/usa/curtiss/sb2c-helldiver.html

points that made the original game diffi cult And it s my hope that this new game will give wargamers for the fi rst time a full appreciation of this great and important battle I wish you good gaming and I look forward to your comments and questions online BIBLIOGRAPHY USSBS Interrogations of Japanese Offi cials Interrogation Nav 3 USSBS No 32 Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa Battle of the Philippine Sea 16 October 1945 https www ibiblio org hyperwar AAF USSBS IJO IJO 3 html F6F Performance records from various wartime performance tests http www wwiiaircraftperformance org f6f f6f html SB2C Helldiver Avialogs archive wartime performance tests and manuals http www avialogs com index php aircraft usa curtiss sb2c helldiver html

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CARRIER BATTLE: PHILIPPINE SEA59
“USS Cavalla - Pacifi c Missions in World War II -- First
Patrol.” http://www.cavalla.org/fi rstpat.html
The submarine USS Cavalla, which sank Shokaku, is
preserved as a museum ship in Galveston, Texas. The
article has interesting details about its operations which
led to the sinking.
“Sunrise, Sunset, and Day Length for Guam.”
timeanddate.com. I am indebted also to this web site
for its discussion of the different phases of twilight.
“Wind Data: Guam.” http://web.utk.edu/~archinfo/
EcoDesign/escurriculum/CLIMATEDATA/CITYDATA/
Guam/GuamWind%7F.html#June
Belote, James H. and William M. Belote. Titans of the
Seas. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.
Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese
Navy. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978.
Greene, Cdr Phil, “Admiral Spruance and The Battle of
the Philippine Sea.” National Defense University, 1994.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a440992.pdf
Hornfi scher, James D. The Fleet at Flood Tide. New
York: Random House, 2016.
Hughes, Capt. Wayne P. Fleet Tactics. Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1986.
Jentschura, Hansgeorg, Warships of the Imperial
Japanese Navy, 1869-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1977.
Kobayashi Hideo, “Sinking of the aircraft carrier Taiho
caused by one hit of a torpedo.” Institute for the Study
of Failure, Failure Knowledge Database. http://www.
shippai.org/fkd/en/cfen/CB1011023.html
Morison, Samuel E., History of United States Naval
Operations in World War II.
Vol 8: New Guinea and the Marianas. Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 1953.
Vol 9: Leyte. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1954.
Sakai, Saburo et al. Samurai! New York: Dutton, 1957.
Sakai, a Japanese fi ghter ace, was based at Iwo Jima
during this campaign and engaged US carrier planes.
His book is useful for its account of fl ying the Zero
against Hellcats, and for his observations on Japanese
pilot training.
Tully, Anthony, et al. “The Sinking of Shokaku -- An
Analysis.” http://www.combinedfl eet.com/shoksink.
htm and http://www.combinedfl eet.com/shoksinknotes.
htm
A detailed analysis and reconstruction of the sinking
of Shokaku. The footnotes page is especially valuable
for its citations of primary sources, including Japanese
sources in translation.
Y’Blood, William T. Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the
Philippine Sea. Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1981.
The basic source and most valuable reference is
the magisterial history by Morison, still the starting
point for anyone who wants to understand any of
the US Navy’s campaigns in World War II. Morison’s
research was prodigious, his fi rst-person viewpoint
irreplaceable, and his prose often magnifi cent; his
books should be forgiven the limitations which others
have pointed out. Like its predecessor, Carrier Battle:
Philippine Sea is above all a game of narrative, and
there is no better narrative than Morison’s. Those
not wishing to tackle all his volumes should get the
excellent one-volume abridgement, The Two-Ocean
War; I bought this in paperback for less than a dollar at
a supermarket book rack more than 45 years ago, thus
taking the fi rst step on the path to the design of these
games.
All that said, the more recent works of Y’Blood and
Hornfi scher -- both published since the appearance
of the original Carrier game -- are very valuable as
well. Y’Blood’s book includes an appendix with a
compendium of all the air-to-air actions.
It’s worth noting that each of these authors takes
a somewhat different stance on the crucial debate
around this battle, concerning the defensive posture of
Admiral Spruance. Morison depicts it as a second-best
accident which worked out, Y’Blood suggests it was a
mistake, and Hornfi scher defends it as the best strategy
available. The disagreement is not over whether
Admiral Spruance accomplished his mission, which
he clearly did, but over whether he could have done
better. For the viewpoint of a modern professional
naval offi cer -- who concurs with Hornfi scher and backs
up Spruance -- see the Greene monograph.
We can thank the Internet for access to some valuable
sources which would have been harder to obtain 30
years ago. The Ozawa interrogation is a unique primary
source. The wartime aircraft performance test results
were the basis for the rules on fuel consumption.
The Kobayashi study is a remarkable source which
challenges the version of events given elsewhere.
Certain aspects of the submarine rules are directly
based on facts gleaned from the sources related to
Cavalla and Shokaku.
Copyright ©2022, Compass Games, LLC

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